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"GUILTY BUT MENTALLY ILL": THE REAL
VERDICT IS GUILTY -
LINDA C. FENTIMAN *
[W]henever strong emotions are aroused by a dissension of opinion, it is a
sign that some basic problem, some instinct-like emotion, more fundamental
than 1 he issue formally under discussion ; has smuggled itself in to cloud the
issue itself and to interfere with the calm and objective examination of fact.'
Few legal or public policy issues in America today have aroused as intense conflict
and emotions as the insanity defense. Although the insanity defense is invoked in far less
than one percent of all felony cases, and is successful in only a fraction of the cases in
which it is invoked,` the view is widely held that the insanity defense is used to "coddle"
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' Zilhoorg, Misconceptions of Legal Insanity, 9 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 540, 544 (1939).
One of the most striking things about the public outcry over the "abuse" of the insanity
defense is the dearth of evidence to support that charge. Nationwide statistics are impossible to
obtain, due to very poor record-keeping among the individual states. See Steadman, Monahan,
Hartstone, Davis, and Robbins, Mentally Disordered Offenders: A National Survey of Patients and Facilities,
6 LAW AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 31, 37 (1982) Thereinafter cited as Mentally Disordered Offenders];
Limiting the Insanity Defence: Hearings on S. 818, S. 1106, S. 1558, S. 1995, S. 2572, S. 2658, and S. 2669
Before the SubComm. on Criminal Law, Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 367 (july 14, 1982)
(statement of Henry J. Steadman). But data from those states that do maintain records on the use of
the insanity defense show that it is rarely invoked, and even more rarely successful. Thus, in New
York it is estimated that only 0.17%, or 220, of the 127,068 felony arrests made in 1978 resulted in
insanity pleas, and of these, only twenty-five percent, or fifty-five were successful. Id. at 3.
In Michigan, in 1977, the insanity plea was raised in 0.11% of all major felony arrests, and was
successful in about eight percent of those cases. Criss and Racine, Impact of Change in Legal Standard
for Those Adjudicated Not Guilty By Reason of Insanity 1975 - 79, 8 Bum., Ara. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 261,
264, 271 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Criss and Racine]. The average number of insanity acquittals in
Michigan during the years 1976 to 1982 was fifty-four. Smith and Hall, Evaluating Michigan's Guilty
But Mentally Ill Verdict: An Empirical Study, 16 J.L. REFORM 77, 107 (1982) (Appendix A, Table A)
[hereinafter cited as Smith and Hall].
Similarly, statistics from California show that in 1980 the 259 insanity acquittals represented only
0.6% of all felony dispositions (the rest were convictions) in that year, and were only 0.1% of all
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criminals and to permit guilty and violent individuals to escape the criminal sanciion. 3
This criticism reflects a basic misunderstanding of both the insanity defense and the
whole of the Anglo-American criminal law as well. The insanity defense is but one
instance of the criminal law's historic insistence that before an individual may be punished
for a wrongful act, he must have consciously elected to do that wrong.' This requirement.
of moral blameworthiness — that one must consciously choose to do evil before punish-
ment is appropriate — permeates the entire criminal law. It is most clearly seen in the
requirement of mens rea, a guilty mind, but it is also found in the defenses of mistake of
fact, duress, provocation, and self-defense, as well as that of insanity. 5
 The Supreme
Court has never addressed the question of whether the insanity defense is constitutionally
compelled." A strong case can be made, however, that it is so compelled, as part of the
felony arrests made in that year. Turner and Ornstein, Distinguishing the Wicked From the Menially ill, 3
CAL. Law. 40, 42 (March, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Turner and Ornstein].
And in New Jersey:
in fiscal year 1982 (July 1, 1981 through June 30, 1982), of the more than 32,500 adult
cases handled by the New Jersey Office of the Puhlic Defender, insanity pleas were
entered in only fifty-two cases [less than one-sixth of one percent of all cases. Further,
the insanity plea] was successful in only fifteen cases. That figure represents ..
one-twentieth of one percent of all cases handled in the course of a year ....
Letter from Joseph H. Rodriguez, Public Advocate for the State of New Jersey to the Editor, 69
A.B.A. J. 560 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Rodriguez Letter].
It is thus apparent that the use, let alone misuse, of the insanity defense does not explain the
storm of controversy constantly raging about it.
• For example, an October 6, 1981 Associated Press-NBC nationwide poll found that eighty-
seven percent of the respondents believed that "'too many murderers are using the insanity plea to
keep from going to prison.'" Jeffrey and Pasewark, Altering Opinions about the Insanity Plea, 11 J.
PSYCHIATRY AND L. 29, 40 n.4 (1983), Similar results were obtained in a spring 1982 study of
university students and local residents in Laramie, Wyoming. In this study, ninety-four percent of
the students and ninety-two percent of the residents agreed with the statement, "[t]he insanity plea is
used too much," and eighty-seven percent of the students and eighty-nine percent of the
townspeople concurred in the belief that, "many people escape responsibility for crimes by pleading
insanity," Id. at 33.
Perhaps one of the most outspoken national critics of the insanity defense is Senator Strom
Thurmond. Thurmond capitalized on the groundswell of public opinion against the insanity defense
following the June, 1982 insanity acquittal of John Hinckley to push for a sharply curtailed insanity
defense for federal defendants. In support of this legislative change, Thurmond argued:
The issue of the insanity defense is one that cries out for legislative reform. Unfortu-
nate as the verdict was in the attempted assassination of the President of the United
States, it did serve to focus the attention of the Nation and this Congress on the serious
short-comings of the insanity test presently applied by the Federal courts. People
throughout the country, from every walk of' life and of every political persuasion, have
called for a change ... so that the law will no longer allow the criminals of this world to
escape responsibility for deliberate, violent vicious acts.
We in the Senate would be shirking our duty to protect law-abiding citizens if we
fail to take the time of this Congress to reform the insanity defense .... and restore
public confidence in our criminal justice system.
... We must ensure that criminals who deliberately plan and carry out brutal acts
of violence with full knowledge of the nature and wrongfulness of their conduct will be
morally condemned by the community and held appropriately accountable for their
acts.
128 Cow:. REC. S. 11,390 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1982) (statement of Sen. Thurmond).
• See infra text accompanying notes 243-55 for a discussion of this issue.
• See infra text accompanying notes 27, 244-51 for a discussion of this issue.
" See infra text accompanying notes 233-42 for a discussion of this issue.
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requirement of moral blameworthiness which is at the heart of our fundamental "concept
of ordered liberty," 7 inherited from the English common law, and thereby guaranteed by
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment."
Despite its firm foundation in English and American criminal jurisprudence, 9 the
insanity defense has always been a source of great public debate. The latest battle in the
controversy was initiated by the June, 1982 verdict of "not guilty by reason of insanity" in
favor of John Hinckley, Jr. after his trial for the attempted assassination of President
Reagan. As a direct result of the verdict, over sixty hills were introduced in Congress
aimed at either restricting or eliminating the insanity defense for federal defendants."' In
October, 1984, these efforts culminated in the enactment of a drastically curtailed insanity
defense as part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act. of 1984. 11 The new law makes
insanity an affirmative defense for federal defendants, one which the defendant must
prove by clear and convincing evidence. In addition, the test for insanity is an extremely
narrow one, focusing only on the defendant's cognitive impairment, 13 and excluding any
volitional impairment due to mental disease or defect as a ground for a defense of
insanity."
Even before the verdict was reached in the Hinckley trial, public concern in recent
years that the insanity defense was being used as a loophole by which the guilty were
escaping punishment had persuaded two state legislatures, in Montana and Idaho, to
eliminate the insanity defense altogether." Moved .by the same concern, twelve states —
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
Morrisette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952); see infra text accompanying 'notes
253-55.
9 See infra text accompanying notes 22-48, 233-73.
See American Bar Association, Standing Committee on Association Standards for Criminal
Justice and Commission on the Mentally Disabled, Report to the House of Delegates, at 12 (Februar•
1983).
11 Pub. L. No. 98-473, 198 Stat. 1837 (1984) (signed by President Reagan on October 12, 1984).
" 18 U.S.C. § 402(a)(20)(b) (1982).
18 U.S.C. § 402(a)(20)(a) (1982) provides that:
It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under any Federal statute that, at the time
of the commission of the acts constituting the offense, the defendant, as a result of' a
severe mental disease or defect, was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the
wrongfulness of his acts. Mental disease or defect does not otherwise constitute a
defense,
14 The new federal definition of insanity is, in effect, a modern and more narrow version of the
nineteen century M'Naghten rule, see infra text accompanying notes 39-45. In contrast to the new law
for federal defendants, the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code provides that a defendant
may assert an insanity defense based on his lack of substantial capacity, due to mental disease or
defect, either to ''appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct
to the requirements of law." MODEL PENAL. CODE § 4.01(1) (1982). See also infra note 48.
' 5 In both Idaho and Montana, evidence of a defendant's mental disease or defect is not
admissible in support of a defense of insanity, but may be offered only to show that the defendant
lacked the requisite state of mind for the offense charged. IDAHO Cone § 18 -207 (1979); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 46-14-101 (1983). In addition, in Montana, evidence of a defendant's mental illness must be
considered by the court at sentencing, to determine whether at the time of the offense, "the
defendant was able to appreciate the criminality of his acts or conform his conduct to the require-
ments of law," MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-311 (1983). If the defendant lacked such ability, then the
defendant is committed to "an appropriate institution for custody, care and treatment" not to exceed
the statutory maximum sentence for the offense of which he has been convicted. MONT. Cone ANN. §
46-14-312(2) (1983). Idaho makes similar provision for the consideration of the convicted defen-
dant's mental illness at sentencing. IDAHO CODE § 19-2523 (Supp. 1984).
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Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, New
Mexico, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and Utah — enacted statutes providing For an
alternative verdict of "guilty but mentally ill" whenever a defendant asserts the insanity
defense.'" In Oregon, the legislature reacted to concerns that insanity acquittees were
being released from state mental hospitals prematurely by creating an entirely new
governmental agency, the Psychiatric Security Review Board, to take over the functions
formerly performed by the courts in supervising the treatment. and release of insanity
acquit ICCS, ' 7
 In addition, in 1983, the Oregon legislature changed its denomination of the
insanity acquittal from " 'not justly responsible .. as a result of mental disease or defect' "
to " 'guilty but insane,'" ' s
 again reflecting the increasingly widespread public hostility
toward the "acquittal" of criminal defendants as a result of their successful assertion of an
insanity defense. All told, in the last five years at least twenty-three slate legislatures have
considered changes in the insanity defense,"
In view of the tremendous public outcry over the insanity defense reflected in this
recent flood of legislative enactments, it is appropriate to reexamine the fundamental
moral and constitutional principles forming the historical underpinnings of the insanity
defense to determine if they are still applicable in the complexity of today's world. If the
principles are applicable, it then becomes necessary to decide whether the alternatives to
the insanity defense which have been proposed or enacted are in harmony with these
fundamental principles. If not, then a determination of whether these alternatives to the
insanity defense should be eliminated is also necessary.
This article will first explore the reasons for the controversy over I he insanity defense
to provide insights, both historical and contemporary, into the purposes and functions of
that defense. A brief examination will be made of judicial decisions in the last twenty
years, which have largely, but. not completely, eliminated the distinctions drawn histori-
cally between the "civilly" and "criminally" mentally ill. The article will then examine the
growing numbers of "Guilty But Mentally Ili" (GBM1) laws, with some emphasis upon the
Michigan statute" as the archetypal GBMI law. it will he argued that the GBM I laws are
fatally flawed in two fundamental respects. First, they unconstitutionally undercut a
criminal defendant's due process right. to present. an insanity defense, by encouraging
juries to reach a compromise GBM I verdict in cases of mentally ill defendants charged
with particularly heinous crimes. Second, because they do not guarantee, and usually do
The constitutionality of Montana's statutory scheme has recently been upheld. State v. Korell,
Mont.	 690 P.2d 992 (1984).
' 6 ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.040 (1983); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-13 (repealed 1983); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 11, § 408 (1982); GA. CODE § 17-7-131 (1984); ILL. Rev. STAT. ch . 38, § 5.6-2 (1984); IND.
CODE § 35-36-2-3 (1982); Ky. REV. STAT. § 504.130 (1982); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 768.36 (West
1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-9-3 (1978 & 1984 Cunt. Supp.); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 314 (Purdon
1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 23A-7-2 (1983); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-13-1 (1983); see also
Institute on Mental Disability and the Law, The "Guilty But Mentally Ill" Verdict: Current State of the
Knowledge (Williamsburg, Virginia: National Center for State Courts, April 1984) (Tentative Draft of
Interim Report, "Guilty But Mentally Ill" Project) [hereinafter cited as Interim Institute Report].
" OR. Rev. STAT. §§ 161.325 to .400 (1981 & Supp. 1983 ).
ie Note, Battle of the Experts Revisited; 1983 Oregon Legislation on the Insanity Defense, 20 WIL-
LAMETTE L. REV. 303, 312-13 (1984) (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 161.319 (1981) and H.B. 2073, 62d
Or. Legislative Assembly (1983)).
'* Id. at 303 (citing The Insanity Defense: ABA and APA Proposals for Change, 7 N1ENTAL DisAn. L.
REP. 136, 140 (1983)).
" Mien. COMP, LAws ANN. § 768.36 (West 1982).
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not provide, psychiatric treatment to defendants found "guilty but mentally Ur these
laws deny those defendants their constitutional right to such treatment." In conclusion,
the article will explain why the insanity defense is essential to the integrity of the criminal
law, and explore the alternative of conditional release as a way in which the many
competing demands on the insanity defense can be reconciled while still passing constit u-
tional muster.
I. THE CONTROVERSY PVER THE INSANITY DEFENSE
A. History of the. Insanity Defense
To understand the present controversy surrounding the insanity defense and to
place the GBM1 statutes in their proper perspective, it is necessary to take a brief look at
the insanity defense and the special role it has played historically. Although the insanity
defense began as a relatively uncomplicated legal device for exercising mercy in the case
of a mentally disturbed offender, it soon was expected to bear the weight of a number of
conflicting legal, moral, and social policy considerations." Even before the development
of the English jury trial system, the law recognized "that [if] a man commits a misdeed
involuntarily, or unintentionally, the case is different from that of one who offends of his
own free will, voluntarily and unintentionally." The result of this distinction in culpability
based on mental state was leniency toward the accused, not his complete exemption from
liability."
Insanity had begun to he recognized as a defense to a criminal charge by the
thirteenth century, although the chattels of' the insane individual were still forfeited to the
king. 24 By the fourteenth century, "a person charged with crime and found to be a
madman was not acquitted; but a special verdict was given that he was mad, and then the
King pardoned him."" Even at this time, the criminal, civil, and political consequences of
" This right inheres in the recognition that the institutional commitment of the mentally' ill
without adequate psychiatric treatment is a violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. See, e.g., Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (the court held that a person
involuntarily committed to a mental hospital after being acquitted of an offense by reasoning of
insanity had a statutory right under District of Columbia law to meaningful, individually tailored
treatment aimed at curing or improving his mental condition); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Stipp. 781,
784-85 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (any involuntarily committed mental patient has a constitutional right to
receive such treatment as will give a realistic opportunity to be cured or to improve his mental
condition). See also infra notes 82-84 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court has held that the
eighth amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment ensures prisoners the right to
adequate medical treatment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). Lower federal courts have found
that the right to adequate medical treatment includes adequate psychiatric treatment. See, e.g.,
Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1977).
" The insanity defense has continued to become complicated because of the tremendous
advances in psychiatric treatment made possible by the advent of psychotropic medication, and the
concomitant changes in the law's view of what is appropriate treatment for the mentally ill resulting
from these medical breakthroughs.
23
 N. WALKER, I CRIME AND INSANITY IN ENGLAND 16-19 (1968) (citing a 10th century law of
Aethelred) [hereinafter cited as N. WALKER].
24
	
CLUECK, MENTAL DISORDER AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 125 (1925), deed in Note, Insanity —
Guilty But Mentally Ill —Diminished Capacity: An Aggregate Approach to Madness, 12 J. MAR. PRAC. Sr
PROC. 351, 357 (1979) thereinafter cited as S. GLUECKI.
23 Id. It has been suggested that the revenue-producing ability of the king's pardon was a
not-inconsiderable aspect of its continuing use, and was perhaps a factor which advanced the time
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being insane were closely connected. Exemplary of this intimate relationship is the Statute
on the King's Prerogative (De Pra?ragrativa Regis) enacted between 1255 and 1290, which
declared that:
The king has the custody of the lands of natural fools 	 taking their profits
without waste, finding them their necessaries ... and after their death must
return them to their rightful heirs. He must. also see to it that [regarding]
anyone who formerly had a memory and understanding [who] is no longer in
his right mind ... [that.] their lands and tenements are safely kept without
waste or destruction; and that they and their families live and are maintained
from the profits; and that what is left for maintaining them is reasonably kept
for their use when they have recovered their memories .... The king shall
take nothing to his own use . . .
Although this statute undoubtedly reflected the influence of the church, which insisted
upon the importance of mens rea 27 as an essential element of a criminal offense:28 it was
also an exercise of shrewd political judgment on the part of the king at a time when he
sought to expand his power. Since it was necessary if a lord was insane that his land be
under the protection of someone, the choice was either that the king would assert a power
of guardianship or that the neighboring lords would take over the insane lord's property.
The king naturally preferred himself as guardian."
By 1581 the notion that insanity precluded criminal responsibility was well estab-
lished. 3° In that year William Lambard published his handbook for justices of the peace,
Eirenarcha, in which he stated:
If a mad man or a naturall foole, or a lunatike in the time of his lunacy, or a
childe y apparently bath no knowledge of good nor euil do a ma, this is no
felonious acte, nor anything forfeited by it ... for they cannot he said to have
any understanding wil. 3 '
This test. is significant both in its apparent recognition that one could lose and then regain
one's sanity, and that the test for sanity was whether one knew the difference between
good and evil. This latter distinction foreshadowed the M'Naghten test enunciated in
1843. 32
By the seventeenth century, the insanity defense had become significant both as a
corollary to the fundamental principle of mens rea and as an important escape valve in
the increasingly harsh system of capital punishment. As to the former, Blackstone stated
when the insanity of the defendant would constitute a complete defense to a crime. See Halpern, The
Fiction of Legal Insanity and the Misuse of Psychiatry, J. LEO. MED. 18, 22 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
Halpern].
' N. WALKER, SRAM note 23, at 25; see also Note, Lunacy and Idiocy — the Old Law and Its Incubus,
18 U. Cut. L. REV. 361, 362 (1951) [hereinafter cited as Note, Lunacy and Idiocy — the Old Law and Its
Incubus].
" Mens rea, of course, is the mental state required for the commission of a crime. It is, in
Blackstone's words, the "vicious will" without which "an unwarrantable act is no crime at all." S
RADISH, S. SCHULHOFER, & M. PAULSON, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS
267 (4th ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as S. RADISH, S. SCHUI.HOFER, & M. PAULSON].
26
 N. WALKER, supra note 23, at 24.
" Note, Lunacy and Idiocy — the Old Law and Its Incubus, supra note 26, at 362.
34) J. Bicus, THE GUILTY MIND 83 (1955) [hereinafter cited as J. Blocs].
Si See id. at 84 (citing EIRENARCHA Cap. 21.218).
31 See infra note 41.
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the law simply: "[T]o constitute a crime . • there must be, first, a vicious will; and
secondly, an unlawful act consequent upon such vicious will . . . [One of the deficiencies
in will which excuses one from criminal responsibility] arises ... from a defective or
vitiated understanding, viz., in an idiot or a lunatic... 33 As to the latter, the insanity defense
was often the only way that the accused could avoid the death penalty. 34
 it has been
suggested that the insanity defense was an especially important check against the draco-
nian system of capital punishment because it was a defense based on "scientific" medical
proof. 3' In an era in which death was the punishment for over 350 offenses in England,
and over 200 crimes in colonial New York, insanity was a much neater way to circumvent
the death penalty than were other, more obvious methods of jury nullification. 35
Yet by the mid-nineteenth century, the pendulum had swung against the insanity
defense. More and more it was viewed, at least by the politically powerful, as an inappro-
priate device for granting exemption from criminal liability. Thus, in 1843, after Daniel
M'Naghten was acquitted on grounds of insanity of the murder of Edward Drummond,
secretary to Prime Minister Robert Peel, a huge outcry was raised on the part of Queen
Victoria, the Prime Minister, and the House of Lords. They, along with a large segment of
the British public, believed that persons who represented a threat to state security were
escaping punishment by invoking the insanity defense. 37 The language of the public
debate sounds remarkably modern and familiar:
[Two editorials] ... from the Illustrated London News . . . . [argued] that
M'Naghten was only simulating insanity and that soft-headed judges and
doctors had let him escape the stern hand of justice. It was suggested that
Bedlam, the "Eden of St. George's Fields," was a soft and pleasant place[,]
.... a "retreat of idleness[,]" and that perhaps M'Naghten and other crimi-
nals were "profitably insane." 38
As a result of this royal and public outcry, the fifteen justices of the common-law
courts were summoned by the House of Lords to answer a series of questions as to the
justices' view of the nature of the insanity defense and the circumstances justifying its
invocation. 39 It was the justices' response to the second and third questions of the series'
which became known as the M'Naghten rule." Even at the time it was announced, the
" 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 19, 21 (1962 Beacon Paperback ed.) (emphasis in original)
[hereinafter cited as W. BLACKSTONE].
34 Morris, The Dangerous Criminal, 41 SO. CAL. L. REV. 514, 518 (1968); Hill, Responsibility and the
Mentally Abnormal Offender, 14 SOC'Y OF PUB. TCHRS. OF L. J. 81, 87 (1977).
35 Halpern, supra note 25, at 21.
" Id. at 20-21.
37 j. BIGGS, supra note 30, at 102-03, 107.
38 Id. at 102-03.
39 Id. at 102-07. -
" The second and third questions put to the common law judges were:
"What are the proper questions to be submitted to the jury, where a person alleged to
be afflicted with insane delusion respecting one or more particular subjects or persons,
is charged with the commission of a crime (murder, for example), and insanity is set up
as -a defence?" And ... "In what terms ought the question to be left to the jury as to the
prisoner's state of mind at the time when the act was committed?"
Id. at 103-04.
" As expressed by these nineteenth century jurists the test for insanity was as follows:
[Elvery man is to be presumed to be sane, and to possess a sufficient degree of reason to be
responsible for his crimes, until the contrary be proved to their satisfaction; and ... to
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M'Naghten rule was met with the criticism that it failed to define adequately or accurately
those circumstances in which a defendant ought to be excused from criminal
Nonetheless, it quickly became the law in England and America."
In the mid-twentieth century, dissatisfaction with the M'Naghten rule grew, stem-
ming in part. from a belief that the rule's focus on cognitive impairment as the sole ground
for an insanity acquittal was psychiatrically unwarranted and inconsistent with the general
purposes of the criminal law." Some also expressed dissatisfaction with the rule on the
ground that it. led to professional perjury. These critics alleged that expert psychiatric
witnesses who believed that the defendant ought not to be held criminally responsible
would force their testimony into the M'Naghten mold to give the jury grounds for
rendering an acquittal on grounds of insanity." Dissatisfaction with the M'Naghten rule
led to the adopt ion in 1954 of the Durham" "product" test of insanit y 47
 in the District of
Columbia, and the American Law Institute - Model Penal Code test for criminal responsi-
bility announced in 1962 as a model for legislative enactment.".
establish a defense on the grounds of insanity, it must he clearly proved that, at the time
of committing of the act, the party accused was laboring under such a defect of reason, from
disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did
know it, that he did not know that he was doing what was wrong.
X Clark and Finnelly 208, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722, cited in J. Itic.cs, supra note 30, at 105 (emphasis
added in J. BioGs).
" The pioneering American psychiatrist Dr. Issac Ray immediately criticized the M'Naghten
rule as being inconsistent with the reality of human psychology. J. Biccis, supra note 30, at 109-10,
115-16.
" Only New Hampshire rejected the M'Naghten rule, through the influence.of Justice Charles
Doe of the Supreme Judicial Court, who was persuaded by the writings of Dr. Ray that the
M'Naghten rule was inappropriate. Id, at 111-16; W. LA FAVE & A. Scorr, HANoaciox ON CRIMINAI,
1,AW 286-87 (1972) (hereinafter cited as W. LA FAVE & A. SCOTT].
" People v. Drew, 22 Cal. 3d. 333, 341-42, 344, 583 P.2d 1318, 1326, 149 Cal. Rptr. 275, 278-81
(1978); W. LA FAVE & A. Scan- , supra note 43, at 280-82.
45 See, e.g., People v. Drew, 22 Cal. 3d 333, 334, 583 P.2d 1318, 1323, 149 Cal. Rptr. 275, 279
(1978). But :see W. LA FAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 43, at 282-83, and sources cited therein.
46 Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
" The Durham court declared:
[A]n accused is not criminally responsible if' his unlawful act was the product of mental
disease or mental defect.
We use "disease" in the sense of a condition which is considered capable of either
improving or deteriorating. We use "defect" in the sense of a condition which is not
considered capable of either improving or deteriorating and which may be either
congenital, or the result of injury, or the residual effect of a physical or mental disease.
Id. at 875. The Durham decision was overruled by United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir.
1972).
4' The American Law Institute (A1,1) test for insanity provides that:
1. A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a
result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate
the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.
2. The terms "mental disease or defect" do not include an abnormality manifested only
by repeated criminal and otherwise anti-social conduct.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1962), cited in A. STONE, MENTAL HEALTH AND
LAW; A SYSTEM IN TRANSITION 230 (1975). The second paragraph has been adopted in some, but not
all, of the jurisdictions which have adopted the ALI test of insanity.
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B. The Disparity Between the "Civilly" and "Criminally" Mentally Ill
At about the same time that judges and legal scholars were struggling with an
appropriate way to define those circumstances in which the insanity defense was appro-
priate, a legal backlash began to grow against the excesses of the "therapeutic state." 49 In
three landmark cases, Baxstrom v. Herold , 5"Specht v. Patterson ,' and Jackson v. Indiana , 51 the
United States Supreme Court went on record declaring that the different treatment
accorded the "civilly", and "criminally" mentally ill violated the due process and equal
protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment.
In Baxstrom v. Herold, Baxstrom, a New York prisoner, was certified as insane while
serving a two-and-a-half to three-year term for assault. Accordingly, he was transferred to
the Department of Corrections psychiatric hospital at Dannemora. When his prison
sentence was about to expire, he was civilly committed after a court found that he was
"mentally ill and in need of hospital and institutional care." 53 The court. did not decide
whether that care should be provided in a hospital operated by the Department of
Corrections or the Department of Mental Hygiene, as it lacked statutory authorization to
do so. Rather, that decision was made administratively and ex parte by the Department of
Mental Hygiene. Thereafter, Baxstrom was returned to Dannemora, this time nominally
under the control of the Department of Mental Hygiene. When, live years later, the
Supreme Court. reviewed his case, it found that Baxstrom had been denied the equal
protection of the laws, both because he had been denied the right. to a jury trial which was
granted all potential civil committees under New York law, and because his commitment.
was based on an adminstrative, rather than a judicial, determination of his dangerous-
ness, again contrary to New York's treatment of the "civilly" mentally ill. The Supreme
Court ordered that a new judicial hearing he held, at which Baxstrom's present mental
state, need for hospitalization, and potential dangerousness would be determined, with
the same procedural protections and substantive criteria guaranteed prospective civil
commitees.
The following year, in Specht v. Patterson, the Supreme Court invalidated a Colorado
statute that permitted defendants convicted of sexual crimes to be sentenced indetermi-
nately without a hearing or an opportunity to confront the psychiatric evidence against
them. Specht. had been convicted of the crime of "indecent liberties," which carried a
maximum sentence of ten years. On the basis of that crime, he was further convicted,
pursuant to the Colorado Sex Offenders Act, of being a sex offender and committed for
an indefinite term. The commitment decision was made by a judge, without a hearing and
without the opportunity for Specht to confront the authors of the psychiatric reports
considered by the judge. The Supreme Court held that this proceeding, withh its possibility
of much longer incarceration t han that for his substantive criminal offense, denied Specht
due process of law, and required the reversal of his conviction.
In Jackson v. Indiana, the Supreme Court struck down, as violative of both due process
and equal protection, the indefinite commitment as incompetent to stand trial of a
27-year-old deaf-mute who had the mental age of a pre-school child. The Court found
49 See generally N. KITERIE, THE RIGHT TO BE DIFFERENT: DEVIANCE AND ENFORCED THERAPY
(1971), condemning the rise of the therapeutic state, in which indefinite civil commitment of the
mentally ill and other social outcasts has been justified on the paternalistic grounds of treatment.
5° 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
51 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
92
 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
33 Baxstrom, 383 U.S. at 108.
610	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 26: 601
that it was so unlikely that the defendant, Jackson, might ever attain the competence
necessary to stand tria1 54 that his continued commitment as incompetent was effectively a
sentence of life imprisonment. According to t he Court, Jackson's commitment violated
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, in that, had he not been
charged with a crime, the state would have been able to commit and continue to detain
him only by meeting the more stringent standards applicable to persons alleged to be
mentally ill or mentally defective and in need of treatment or custodial care. The Court
also held that the failure of the state to accord Jackson " 'formal commitment proceedings
addressed to [his] ability to function in society,' or to society's interest in his restraint ... ,
or to the state's ability to aid him in attaining competency through custodial care or
compulsory treatment"" denied him the due process of law. The Court ruled that "[a]t
the least, due process requires that the nature and duration of commitment bear some
reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is cotnmitted." 56
The trend, embodied in these three cases, toward abolishing the distinction between
the "civilly" and "criminally" mentally ill has been cut short by two more recent Supreme
Court decisions: Addington v. Texas" and Jones v. United States." In Addington the Supreme
Court declared that for a state to commit the mentally ill civilly, it need only establish the
existence of the relevant commitment criteria by "clear and convincing evidence." Accord-
ing to the Court, a requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt would impose a
burden too great for the states to meet in many cases, thus denying some individuals
needed medical treatment." In Jones, the Court declared that a rational basis existed for
holding an insanity acquittee in civil confinement long after he would have been released
had he been found guilty of the crime charged, relying on the argument of the District of
Columbia that since Jones was being confined for purposes of "treatment, not punish-
ment," an indefinite commitment was appropriate.'"
C. The Function of the Insanity Defense
Today, public concern over the insanity defense has called the continued existence of
the defense into question. The perception that the Hinckley verdict was a miscarriage of
justice, along with an increased public concern with crime in general, has led to a new
chorus of demands that the insanity defense be reformed or eliminated. Something about
the insanity defense gnaws at the public, making people uneasy at the thought of
releasing individuals deemed not legally responsible because they either did not know
what they were doing was wrong or could not slop themselves from doing it. To a large
extent., this concern arises because the defense is not simply a means of determining the
question of responsibility for crime. Rather, the insanity defense has been called upon to
accomplish a number of social purposes which are increasingly in conflict. These other
purposes are, on the one hand, the public's desire to punish the mentally ill criminal and
to keep him removed from the community for a number of years, out of fear that, if not
" Competence for the purposes of standing trial has been defined generally as the ability of the
defendant "to understand the nature of the charges against him and to participate in his defense."
See, e.g., Jackson, 406 U.S. at 718.
' 5 Id. at 738 (quoting In re Hannon, 425 F.2d 916, 918 (1st Cir. 1970)).
66 Id.
57 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
" 463 U.S. 354 (1983).
" Addington, 441 U.S. at 432-33.
80 Jones, 463 U.S. at 368-69.
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incarcerated, he will offend again, and on the other, the public's concomitant but conflict-
ing sense of moral obligation to treat, not punish, the sick.
Essentially, the legal instrument of the insanity defense is being used to answer three
questions: the moral question of criminal responsibility and blameworthiness, the psychi-
atric question of the medically appropriate disposition of the mentally ill offender, and
the social policy question of the proper means of protecting society from potentially
dangerous individuals. 61 The difficulty of accommodating such divergent needs has been
noted by the American Bar Association (ABA) Standing Committee on Association
Standards for Criminal Justice and the ABA Commission on the Mentally Disabled:
"Determinations regarding the defendant's criminal responsibility for the act are, in
essence, backward-looking and are based on moral criteria. Dispositional determinations
are forward-looking and depend primarily upon predictive judgments about the defen-
dant's future behavior and the possibility of successful treatment."' For one legal device
to address all these criteria, and to provide mutually reconcilable answers to each, is a
Herculean task.°
Historically, much less was required of the insanity defense. As noted previously, at
its inception in English law t he insanity defense was primarily an instrument of religious
judgment, providing an exemption from criminal responsibility to those who did not
know the difference between good and evil or who lacked a vicious will. Although the
defense was not without its political advantages to the monarchy, primarily it reflected an
ecclesiastical influence: "[T]tle insanity defense ... was from our earliest experiences
essentially a guide to the determination of the moral, rather than the medical, fibre of the
individual."4
Yet at the same time, that moral judgment of "not justly responsible" was accom-
panied by the declaration of "too dangerous to be allowed on the public streets:"
[The purpose of the insanity defense was] not to absolve of criminal responsi-
bility "sick" persons who would otherwise be subject to criminal sanction.
Rather, its real function {was] to authorize the state to hold those "who
must be found not to possess the guilty mind mens rea," even though the
6' These questions are not unique to the insanity defense. Anglo-American jurisprudence has
also asked these questions concerning the defense of diminished capacity, the defense of voluntary
intoxication due to alcohol or other drugs, and the appropriateness of premeditation and delibera-
tion as the mental state distinguishing particularly heinous murders from other, "lesser," murders.
See, e.g., MODEL PENAL. CODE § 210.3 comment, § 210.6 comment (1982), quoted in S. KADISH, S.
SCHULHOFER, & M. PAULSON, supra note 27, at 441, 425; MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08 comment (Tent.
Draft No. 8, 1959), quoted in S. KADISH, S. SCHULHOFER, & M. PAULSON, SUpra note 27, at 806-08. For a
broader discussion of the appropriate relationship between mental illness and criminal responsibility
see Kadish, The Decline of Innocence, 26 CAMBRIDGE L. J. 273 (1968) and B. WooYroN, CRIME AND THE
CRIMINAL. LAW (1963).
62 The ABA Standing Committee on Association Standards for Criminal Justice and the ABA
Commission on the Mentally Disabled, Report to the House of Delegates, at 8 (February, 1983)
[hereinafter cited as ABA, Report to the House of Delegates].
63 The insanity defense is a classic example of Professor Ernest Roberts' "tensile strength"
theory of the law. According to Roberts, every legal principle can only hold a certain amount of
emotional or political freight, and that amount is defined as its tensile strength. When a principle is
pushed beyond its tensile strength by expansionist litigators or creative legislators, it will simply fall
apart. Lectures by Ernest Roberts on Environmental Law, Harvard Law School (Spring, 1983).
Gostin,Justifications for the Insanity Defense in Great Britain and the United States: The Conflicting
Rationales of Morality and Compassion, 9 But.r.. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 100, 101 (1981) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Gostin].
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criminal law demands that no person be held criminally responsible if doubt is
cast on any material element of the offense charged .... [Thus,] the insanity
defense [was] ... not designed, as [was] . the defense of self-defense, to
define an exception to criminal liability, but rather to define for sanction an
exception from among those who would [otherwise] be free of liability. 65
Historically, then, it has been possible for defenders of the insanity defense to say that it
distinguished the "wicked" from the "sick," without having to worry that. the "sick" would
ever get well enough to be released into the community. The underlying rationale for the
lengthy commitment of individuals found not guilty by reason of insanity was a quasi-
estoppel notion which has been aptly denominated "the clean-up doctrine" — the
assumption that a defendant is either responsible enough to deserve punishment or
insane enough to deserve cornmitment." 66
 Twice in the last twenty-five years, the Su-
preme Court has premised its decisions on this clean-up doctrine, declaring that because
an insanity acquittee has been charged with a crime he is different, and less deserving of
procedural and substantive protection, than a "civilly" mentally ill person. In Lynch v.
Overholser, 1 i 7
 the Court upheld a District of Columbia statute which required that insanity
acquinees be automatically committed upon acquittal, reasoning that, "Congress might
have thought ... that having successfully claimed insanity to avoid punishment, the
accused should then bear the burden of proving that he is no longer subject to the same
mental abnormality which produced his criminal acts." 68 The Court also hypothesized, as
an alternative basis for the District of Columbia automatic commitment statute, that it was
necessary to deter "false pleas" of insanity."
Likewise intones v. United States," the Supreme Court overlooked the precedents of
Baxtrom v. Herold, 71 Specht v. Patterson, 72 and Jackson v. Indianan which . had repeatedly
invalidated the criminal-civil distinction in state treatment of the mentally ill," to find that
insanit y acquittees and potent ial civil committees were different in terms of the procedures
which could be used to secure their incarceration and the length of time that such
incarceration might last." Specifically, the Court stressed the police power interest of the
state, declaring that a "common sense" inference of continued insanity and present
dangerousness could he drawn from the successful invocation of a not guilty by reason of
insanity plea. Such an inference, according to the Court, obviated the need for the state to
establish by clear and convincing evidence, as in the case of a civil committee, that the
" Goldstein and Katz, Abolish the "Insanity Defense" — Why Not?, 72 YALE L.J. 853, 864-65 (1963)
(footnotes omitted).
"'' Note, Commitment Following An Insanity Acquittal, 94 HARV. L. REV. 605, 618 (1981).
" 369 U.S. 705 (1962).
66 Id. at 715. Placing the burden on the insanity acquittee to show his present sanity was often
justified on the ground of a presumption of continuing insanity, particularly in states where the
defendant had the burden at trial of proving that insanity at the time of the offense. See, e.g., In re
Franklin, 7 Cal, 3d 126, 140-41, 496 P. 2d 465, 474, 101 Cal. Rptr. 553, 561-62 (1972).
69
 Lynch v. Olverholser, , 369 U.S. at 715.
7°
 463 U.S. 354 (1983).
71
 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
72
 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
" 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
74
 See supra text accompanying notes 50-56.
7' _Jones, 463 U.S. at 361-70.
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individual in question was presently mentally ill and dangerous." At the same time, the
Court relied heavily on the state's role as parens patriae, finding that because the purpose
of commitment of insanity acquittees is treatment and not punishment, an insanity
acquittee could constitutionally he "treated" indefinitely, for a term far beyond that which
he would have served had he been found guilty as charged." Thus, underlines, a verdict
of "not guilty by reason of insanity" is for many "acquitted" defendants a sentence to a
lifetime of incarceration.
In practice, however, the likelihood for many other insanity acquittees is that they will
spend a relatively short period in confinement, due to the convergence of two legal and
medical trends. In medicine, the development and expanded use since the 1950's of a
wide variety of psychotropic drugs," capable of radically changing a mentally ill person's
symptoms and behavior, have completely revolutionized the treatment of the mentally ill,
including insanity acquittees. Today, because many persons ultimately found not guilty by
reason of insanity receive psychiatric treatment, including psychotropic medication, while
awaiting trial," a large number of persons found not guilty by reason of insanity are
declared, upon psychiatric evaluation after trial, to be presently sane." 6 In Michigan, for
example, between 1975 and 1982 forty-three percent of the 396 persons acquitted on
grounds of insanity were released after the mandatory sixty-day psychiatric evaluation
period because they failed to meet. the criteria for involuntary civil commitment."'
Simultaneously with, and partly as a consequence of, these medical advances, civil
rights lawyers have mounted successful constitutional challenges to the treatment of the
mentally ill, both those civilly committed and those found not guilty by reason of insanity.
Critics of the mental health system have contended, and found state and lower federal
court. judges who agreed with them, that there is a constitutional right to such psychiatric
treatment as "will give each [individual] ... a realistic opportunity to be cured or to
improVe his or her mental condition."' Although the Supreme Court has so far declined
to find that a constitutional right to treatment exists," 3
 other courts have begun to build a
" Id. at 366.
" Id. at 368-69.
"Psychotropic" is the general term used to describe medication which has an effect on the
psyche, altering the feelings, thinking, and behavior of the person to whom they are administered.
STEDMEN'S MEDICAL. DICTIONARY 1167 (1976); see Bakdessarini, Chemotherapy, in THE. HARVARD GUIDE
TO MODERN PSYCHIATRY 387 (A. Nicholi ed. 1978).
79 A mentally incompetent defendant may not stand trial. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378
(1966). Many insanity acquittees receive psychiatric treatment while awaiting trial to restore their
competency. Criss and Racine, supra note 2, at 262.
80 See, e.g. , The Insanity Defense, Hearings on S. 818, S. 1106, S. 1558, S. 260, S. 2672, S. 2678, S.
2745 and S. 2780 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 464 (1982) (testimony of
Dr. Robert Sadoff) [hereinafter cited as Insanity Hearings].
81 This data was obtained during several telephone conversations in March, 1983 with Dr,
Harley Stock, psychologist at the Michigan Center for Forensic Psychiatry. The data grew out of a
research project he was conducting with Dr. Lynn Blunt of the Center for Forensic Psychiatry
[hereinafter cited as Blunt and Stock Study]. Some of the data from this research project has been
reported by Smith and Hall, supra note 2. See also Criss and Racine, supra note 2, at 262.
82 See, e.g., Ohlinger v. Watson, 652 F. 2d 775, 778 (9th Cir. 1980); Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d
451, 455 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 784-85 (M.D. Ala. 1972); In re R.G.W.,
145 N.J. Super. 167, 178, 366 A.2d 1375, 1381-82 (1976). See alto supra note 21.
" In Donaldson v. O'Connor, 422 U.S. 563 (1975), the Supreme Court specifically refused to
decide the question of whether a person civilly committed as mentally ill had a constitutional right to
treatment. Instead, the Court held only that the continued confinement, and thus deprivation of
liberty, of a person who is not dangerous and who could survive in society with the help of others was
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definition of the right to treatment which encompasses the right to be treated in the least
restrictive way necessary to satisfy the slate's interest in protecting either the individual's
safety, the public's safety, or both." At the same lime, narrower, more definite commit-
ment criteria and higher burdens of proof for both initial and continued commitment of
the mentally ill have been found to be constitutionally required." 5
 Most. significantly for
persons found not guilty by reason of insanity, increasing numbers of courts and state
legislatures have found that both due process and equal protection requirements man-
date that insanity acquittees be evaluated soon after their acquittal to determine their
present sanity, and that, if found presently sane, they must be released."" In addition,
courts and legislatures have begun to require that criminal and mental health codes be
amended to eliminate the disparity between the procedures and standards used to
determine the present sanity of insanity acquittees and persons involuntarily civilly
committed.' The extent to which this burgeoning trend may have been dealt a severe
setback by the Supreme Court's decision in United Stales v. Jones is as yet unclear."' It is
against this backdrop of the historical role of the insanity defense, and the more recent
legislative and judicial reforms and medical breakthroughs which have occurred, that new
approaches to the disposition and treatment of mentally ill offenders, specifically the
GBMI statutes, must be evaluated.
II. THE "GUILTY But MENTALLY ILL" STATUTES
A. Introduction
When, in 1975, the Michigan legislature enacted the first "Guilty But Mentally Ill"
(GBMI) statute, it began a nationwide trend which has so far been followed by Alaska,
Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, New Mexico, Pennsylvania,
a violation of the right to liberty guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. 422 U.S. at 576. For an
intriguing analysis of the Court's decisionmaking process in the Donaldson case, see B. WOODWARD
AND S. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 369-83 (1979). See also Youngberg
v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982), in which the Supreme Court adopted a balancing approach
between the legitimate interests of the State and the rights of the involuntarily commit-
ted to reasonable conditions of safety and freedom from unreasonable restraints ....
[T]he Constitution only requires that the courts make certain that professional judg-
ment was in fact exercised. It is not appropriate for the courts to specify which of
several professionally acceptable choices should have been made.
457 U.S. at 321 (quoting Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147, 178 (1980) (Seitz, C.J., concurring)).
64
 Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617, 619 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657
(D.C. Cir. 1966).
" See, e.g., Addington, 441 U.S. at 432-33 (clear and convincing evidence required to commit a
mentally ill individual civilly); Suzuki v. Alba, 483 F. Supp. 1106 (D. Flaw. 1977), aff 'd in part, rev'd in
part, sub nom. Suzuki v. Yuen, 617 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1980) (In order for the state to commit an
individual civilly, there must be a finding that because of his mental illness, there is an imminent and
substantial danger of harm to himself or others, evidenced by a recent overt act, attempt or threat.);
In re S.L., 94 N.J. 128, 462 A.2d 1252 (1983) (state may not civilly commit the mentally ill solely to
provide them with custodial care). See generally, Groethe, Overt Dangerous Behavior as a Constitutional
Requirement for Involuntary Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 44 U. Cm. L. REV. 562 (1977).
86 See, e.g., Bolton v. Harris, 395 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1968); People v. McQuillan, 392 Mich. 511,
221 N.W.2d 569 (1974); State v. Fields, 77 N.J. 28, 390 A.2d 574 (1978); State v. Krol, 68 N.J. 236,
344 A.2d 289 (1975).
" See, e.g., Bolton v. Harris, 395 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1968); People v. McQuillan, 392 Mich. 511,
221 N.W.2d 569 (1974); State v. Fields, 77 N.J. 28, 390 A.2d 574 (1978); State v. Krol, 68 N.J. 236,
344 A.2d 289 (1975).
" See supra text accompanying notes 70-77.
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South Dakota, and Utah." Eleven more state legislatures have considered or are presently
considering such legislation," and the United States Attorney General's Task Force on
Violent Crime has also recommended the enactment of' the GBMI verdict as a supple-
ment to the insanity defense for federal crimes. 91 This section will examine the GBMI
statutes of Michigan and other states to analyze the legal and policy implications of the
GBMI verdict. The experience of Michigan and the other GBMI states will be discussed as
exemplary of a nationwide trend in which courts and state legislatures have shifted away
from a solicitous approach toward the rights of prisoners and the mentally ill generally to
a focus on the protection of public safety.
The GBM1 verdict has a dual purpose. Its primary goal is to limit. the number of
persons who may he found not guilty by reason of insanity, thereby increasing the
numbers found guilty — albeit mentally ill — and who are therefore subject to imprison-
ment. Additionally, the GBMI statute holds out the promise of psychiatric therapy and
treatment, in a prison setting, to defendants whose mental illness contributed to their
commission of a crime. The attempt of the GBM1 laws to satisfy both the police power
goal of protecting the public by keeping dangerous individuals off the streets and the
parens patriae goal of helping and treating the mentally ill, however, is seriously flawed.
The statutes raise the gravest of constitutional questions concerning a criminal defen-
dant's right to present an insanity defense, his right.s to equal protection and due process
of law when compared both with other criminal defendants and with other mentally ill
individuals whom the state seeks to commit, and his right to adequate psychiatric treat-
ment.
It is the thesis of this article that the GBMI statutes are constitutionally invalid, for
several reasons. First, they unconstitutionally attempt to undercut the ability of a criminal
defendant to present. a successful insanity defense. Due to the overlapping and substan-
tially similar definitions of "insanity" and "mental illness" under the GBMI laws,92 it is
possible, and indeed likely, for a court or jury to use the GBMI alternative to reach an
improper compromise verdict. The availability of the GBMI verdict encourages the trier
of fact to resolve its reasonable doubts about the defendant's insanity at the time of the
offense charged in favor of a finding of "guilty but mentally ill," because of the f'actfin-
der's desire both to keep dangerous people off the streets and to provide psychiatric
treatment for the mentally ill. The possibility of such a compromise verdict denies the
defendant his right to due process of law under the fourteenth amendment.
Second, the psychiatric treatment. promised by the GBMI statutes is not, in fact,
provided in many instances, and a number of mentally ill offenders are therefore denied
their constitutional right to treatment. Even in cases where psychiatric treatment is
provided to individuals found "guilty but mentally ill," it is often not of the same quality
provided to individuals found not guilty by reason of insanity or individuals who are
confined under civil commit ment laws, and thus the person found "guilty but mentally ill"
who should have been found not guilty by reason of insanity is denied the equal protec-
tion of the laws guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. Equal protection principles
are also violated because persons found not guilty by reason of insanity will be incarcer-
8' See generally Interim Institute Report, supra note 16.
9° Interim Institute Report, supra note 16, at 8, n.23.
91 U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON VIOLENT CRIME, FINAL REPORT
54 (1981).
92 See infra text accompanying notes 120-32, and 193-217.
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aced only as long as their insanity continues, while persons found "guilty but mentally ill"
are committed to the state's department of corrections" for a full prison term, regardless
of whether they have recovered their sanity.
B. Background of the GBMI Statutes
To understand the impetus for the Michigan GBMI statute, the progenitor of all the
other GBMI statutes, it is necessary to consider the 1974 Michigan Supreme Court.
decision in People v. McQuillan , 31
 and the public outcry following in its wake. In McQuillan
the court struck down the Michigan law governing the commitment and release of
persons acquit ted on grounds of insanity, finding that it violated both the clue process and
equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment, In reaching this result, the court
relied heavily on four cases which had significantly eroded the differential treatment
accorded the "civilly" and "criminally" mentally Baxstrom v. Herold," Specht v. Patter-
son, 9"Jackson v. Indiana," and Bolton v. Harris. 99
The decisions in Baxstrom,Specht,andJackson have already been discussed." In Bolton,
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia relied upon the decisions in Baxstrom
and Specht to find that the same due process and equal protection considerations which
had militated against a criminal/civil distinction among the mentally ill in those cases also
required the elimination of that distinction in the case of insanity acquittees. To meet the
constitutional objections which had been raised to the District. of Columbia statute requir-
ing the automatic civil commitment of persons found NCI, the court read into the District
of Columbia law a provision fbr a post-acquittal hearing on an insanity acquittee's present.
sanity, to be governed by procedures "substantially similar to those in civircommitment
proceedings."'" The court rejected "prior criminal conduct" as a justification for sig-
nificant differences in the commitment process and criteria,'" and declared that "[an
insanity] plea is neither an express nor implied admission of present. illness, and acquittal
rests only on a reasonable doubt of past sanity, i.e. at the time of the offense."'" Accord-
ingly, the court. permitted automatic commitment only for "the period required to
determine present mental condition." 113
 In addition, the court. incorporated into the law
on release of insanity acquittees the requirements of civil commitment law: that a mental
patient had the right to be examined by an outside psychiatrist and was entitled to a court
hearing if' any psychiatrist believed that he should be released. The court upheld, how-
ever, the law authorizing judicial review of the mental hospital's decision to release an
insanity acquittee, even though such review was not provided in the case of civil commit-
tees.
93 A defendant found "guilty but mentally ill" may be paroled under the jurisdiction of the
Department of Corrections for a portion of his term. Micti. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 768.36(3) (West
1982).
" 392 Mich. 511, 221 N.W.2d 569 (1974).
" 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
" 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
" 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
99 395 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
" See supra text accompanying notes 50-56.
'ix' Bolton, 395 F.2d at 651.
101 Id. at 649.
I" Id. (emphasis in original).
"3
 Id. at 651.
104 Although Bolton v. Harris has long been hailed as a major victory for insanity acquittees,
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In People v. McQuillan the Michigan Supreme Court followed the reasoning of
Baxstrom, Specht, Jackson, and Bolton, and declared that the Michigan procedures for the
commitment and release of insanity acquit tees violated the constitutional requirements of
due process and equal protection of the laws. The court reasoned that an acquittal on the
grounds of insanity established only that the state had failed to meet its burden of proving
the defendant's sanity beyond a reasonable doubt, and that even this inference of lack of
sanity at the time of the crime was of limited probative value after an insanity acquittal. 11'5
Hence the court held that an insanity acquittee could be committed for a period of no
more than sixty days for an intensive psychiatric evaluation. Thereafter, the acquittee
was entitled to a full-scale hearing on his present sanity, to be governed by the same
procedures applicable to the involuntary civil commitment of the mentally ill. 1 ° 7 If the
acquittee was presently sane, he was required to be released. If he was still suffering from
mental illness, he was to be treated as a civil committee in regard to the standards and
procedures applicable to his release.'" In addition to announcing standards to he applied
prospectively to the commitment and release of persons acquitted on grounds of insanity,
the court also held that the 270 insanity acquittees presently confined must be given a
hearing within seventy days or released."'
Within several months of the McQuillan decision, some sixty-four insanity acquittees
had been discharged from confinement., having been found presently sane."° Within a
short time thereafter, one of the sixty-four had murdered his wife, and another had
committed two rapes."'
The public outcry was enormous. Less than eleven months after McQuillan was
decided, the Michigan legislature enacted the nation's first "Guilty But Mentally Ill"
statute. Proponents of the GBMI verdict argued that it was necessary "to protect the
public from violence inflicted by persons with mental ailments who slipped through the
cracks in the criminal justice system," by permitting long-term incarceration of the
mentally ill offender."' Particular concern was voiced about those who, after an insanity
least one commentator remains skeptical. Alexander Brooks has found that "[a] careful reading of
the case reveals that judicial review became possible, not mandatory. Although theoretically either
the hospital or the patient could initiate release proceedings, in fact the initiative was almost
exclusively that of the hospital." A. BROOKS, LAW, PSYCHIATRY AND THE MENTAI, HEALTH SYSTEM 393
(1974). Further, Brooks found that as a practical matter, only three percent of the 275 petitions for
habeas corpus filed by patients at St. Elizabeth's Hospital in the District of Columbia during 1968 and
1969 were granted. Id.
1 " McQuillan, 392 Mich. at 527-28, 221 N.W.2d at 578.
1" Id. at 528, 221 N.W.2d at 578. In rendering its decision, the McQuillan court failed to
mention that the Michigan legislature had reached virtually the same result by statute the month
before the decision.
1" Id. at 529-37, 221 N.W.2d at 577-81.
1 °8 Id. at 533-44, 221 N.W.2d at 581-84.
Id. at 547, 221 N.W.2d at 586; Petrella, Benedek, Bank, and Packer, Examining the Application
of the Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict in Michigan, 36 HOSP. AND COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 254, 255 (1985)
[hereinafter cited as Michigan GBMI Verdict].
I"' Comment, Guilty But Mentally Ill: A Reasonable Compromise pr Pennsylvania, 85 Dicx. L. REV.
289, 307 (1980 -81).
'" Comment, Guilty But Mentally Ill: An Historical and Constitutional Analysis, 53 J. URR, L. 471,
482-83 (1976).
"" People v. Seefeld, 95 Mich. App. 197, 199, 290 N.W.2d 123, 124 (1980). Michigan legislators
were candid in conceding that the goal of the GBMI statute was to keep more mentally ill offenders
incarcerated for longer periods of time:
618	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 26: 601
acquittal, were treated with drugs and then released, without any real "cure" of their
underlying mental illness." 3 There was widespread fear that such people would stop
taking their medication after release, and would thus become "walking time bombs
waiting to explode." 4 Other advocates of the GBMI scheme stressed that. it. would
provide needed psychiatric treatment for mentally ill offenders, which would serve both
the goals of easing their suffering and of curing their anti-social and criminal tenden-
cies."5 Similar concerns were voiced by legislators and the public in other states." 6
C. GBMI — The Statutory Scheme
The Michigan GBMI statute, enacted in response to McQuillan, thus was designed to
meet the dual goals of public protection and psychiatric treatment for mentally ill
offenders. To assess accurately whether either of these legislative goals has been achieved
by the Michigan GBMI verdict or the statutes modeled on it, it is necessary first to look at
the various statutory provisions and then to examine how these statutes have worked in
practice.
Proponents of the guilty but mentally ill statute contend[ed] that it would protect
society by allowing for incarceration of defendants who might otherwise be found not
guilty by reason of insanity and subsequently released. The legislature anticipated that
this statute would reduce the number of insanity acquittals, solve the problems of
disposition, and simplify jury deliberations. One legislator commented publicly that the
guilty but mentally ill statute was specifically designed to circumvent the McQuillan
decision. The legislative intent was to give the jury an alternative to the verdict of nor
guilty by reason of insanity and thus guarantee that mentally ill offenders would not be
released into the community before a definitive sentence had been served.
Michigan GBMI Verdict, supra note 109, at 255.
Similar public concern was the impetus for the enactment of the GBMI statutes in other states.
In Illinois, for example, Senator George Sangmeister explained the purpose of the proposed GBMI
law to his collegues as follows:
If you are found guilty but mentally ill . . . you're going to get the same sentence as if
you were found guilty. You're not going to go back out on the street, that's the
difference. You're going to get committed to the Department of Mental Health and
then you're going to come back after you're cured to serve the rest of your sentence.
That's the meat and guts of the bill, and that, apparently, is what the people of this state
want.
Chicago Tribune (Perspective), September 4, 1983, p. 1.
Similarly, in Indiana, outraged public reaction to the murder of a mother and her three young
children and concern that the defendant might successfully assert an insanity defense led to the
formation of a group, Protect the Innocent, which worked for the enactment of Indiana's "Guilty But
Mentally Ill" law. Note, Indiana's Guilty But Mentally 111 Statute: Blueprint to Beguile the Jury, 57 IND. L.J.
639, 639 n.4 (1982) (citing Indianapolis News, Sept. 11, 1980, at 19, col. 1). In fact, the defendant was
convicted and executed for the murders. Id. .See Judy v. State, 275 Ind. 145, 148, 416 N.E.2d 95, 96
(1981).
"3 Brown and Wittner, 1978 Annual Survey of Michigan Law: Criminal Law, 25 WAYNE L. REV.
335, 356 (1979).
'" Id. (quoting Detroit News (Magazine), Oct. 1, 1978, at 47).
1 " As the Michigan Supreme Court expressed it:
[T]he Legislature's object in creating this new verdict was to assure supervised mental
health treatment and care for those persons convicted under the laws of our state who
are found to be suffering from mental illness, in the humane hope of restoring their
mental health and possibly thereby deterring any future criminal conduct on their part.
People v. McLeod, 407 Mich. 632, 663-64, 288 N.W.2d 909, 919 (1980).
See supra note 112.
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The statutes may be most easily understood if they are viewed as having two concep-
tually distinct parts: first, provisions setting forth the procedures for the rendering of a
GBMI verdict, and second, provisions elaborating the consequences of such a verdict.
The statutes generally declare that the GBMI verdict is an alternative to the finding of
"Not. Guilty by Reason of Insanity," and delineate those findings which must be made by
the trier of fact to render such a GBM1 verdict. Many of the statutes set forth specific
information the jury is to consider in reaching its conclusion, including, in some states, the
differing consequences of an insanity acquittal and a GBMI verdict. Most often, an
insanity acquittee is committed to a mental hospital, while a defendant found "guilty but
mentally ill" is sent to state prison.
1. What the Verdict Requires
Under most. of the states' schemes, "guilty but. mentally ill" becomes available as a
verdict. only when the defendant places his sanity in issue by raising a defense of not guilty
by reason of insanity.'" The Michigan statute is typical. In that state, a defendant who has
1 " In Michigan, the verdict of "guilty but mentally ill" is available as an option only if the
defendant files notice with the trial court of his intent to raise an insanity defense. The GBM1 verdict
does not come into play if the defendant enters a plea of not guilty or if he pleads guilty. MICH.
Coup. LAWS ANN, §§ 768.36(1), (2) (West 1982) provide that:
(1) If the defendant asserts a defense of insanity in compliance with section 20a [which
requires 30 days notice to the court and prosecutor if the defendant intends to assert
the insanity defense in a felony case], the defendant may he found "guilty but mentally
ill" if, after trial, the trier of fact finds all of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:
(a) That the defendant is guilty of an offense,
(b) That the defendant was mentally ill at the time of the commission of that offense,
(c) That the defendant was not legally insane at the time of the commission of that
offense.
(emphasis added)
(2) If the defendant asserts a defense of insanity in compliance with section 20a and the
defendant waives his right to trial, by jury or by judge, the trial judge, with the approval
of the prosecuting attorney, may accept a plea of guilty but mentally ill in lieu of a plea
of guilty or a plea of nolo contendre. The judge may not accept a plea of guilty but
mentally ill until, with the defendant's consent, he has examined the report or reports
prepared pursuant to section 20a, has held a hearing on the issue of the defendant's
mental illness at which either party may present evidence, and is satisfied that the
defendant was mentally ill at the time of the offense to which the plea is entered. The
reports shall be made a part of the record of the case.
Alaska, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Pennsylvania, South Dakota and Utah have similar provi-
sions. Georgia law provides that:
In all cases in which the defense of insanity is interposed, the jury, or the court if tried by it,
shall find whether the defendant is:
(1) Guilty;
(2) Not guilty;
(3) Not guilty by reason of insanity at the time of the crime; or
(4) Guilty but mentally ill at the time of the crime, but the finding of the guilty but
mentally ill shall.be
 made only in felony cases.
GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(b) (Supp. 1985) (emphasis added).
Under Indiana law:
In all cases in which the defense of insanity is interposed, the jury (or the court if tried by it)
shall find whether the defendant is:
(1) Guilty;
(2) Not guilty;
(3) Not responsible by reason of insanity at the time of the crime; or
(4) Guilty but mentally ill at the time of the crime.
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raised an insanity defense may be found "guilt.y but mentally ill" if, after a jury or court
trial, the trier of fact finds beyond a reasonable doubt:" 8
IND. CODE § 35-36-2-3 (1985) (emphasis added).
Under Kentucky law:
In cases in which the defendant provides evidence at trial of his mental illness or
insanity at the time of the offense, the jury or court may find the defendant:
(I) Guilty;
(2) Not guilty;
(3) Not guilty by reason of insanity at the time of the offense; or
(4) Guilty but mentally ill at the time of the offense.
KY. REV. STAT. § 504.120 (1985).
Under South Dakota law:
If the defense of insanity or mental illness has been presented during a trial, the
court shall provide the jury with a special verdict form of "guilty but mentally ill" for
each offense. The court shall instruct the jury that a special verdict of "guilty but
mentally ill" may be returned instead of a general verdict. The court shall also instruct
that jury that the special verdict requires a finding beyond a reasonable doubt by the
jury that the defendant committed the offense and that the defendant was not insane at
the time he committed the offense, but that he was menially ill at the time.
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-25-13 (Supp. 1984).
So too in Alaska, it is only where a defendant files notice that he intends to raise a defense of
insanity or a defense that he lacked the mens rea required for the commission of the crime (which, if
successful, results in a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity, ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.020a (1984)),
that the trier of fact will be given the opportunity to find the defendant "guilty but mentally ill."
ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.040(a) (1984) provides that:
In a prosecution for a crime when the affirmative defense of insanity is raised under AS
12.47.010, or when evidence of a mental disease or defect of the defendant is otherwise
admissible at trial under AS 12.47.020, the trier of fact shall find, and the verdict shall
state, whether the defendant is
(1) Guilty;
(2) Not guilty;
(3) Not guilty by reason of insanity; or
(4) Guilty but mentally ill.
Id. (emphasis added).
in Pennsylvania:
A person who timely offers a defense of insanity in accordance with the Rules of Criminal
Procedure may be found "guilty but mentally ill" at trial if the trier of facts finds,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the person is guilty of an offense, was mentally ill at the
time of the commission of the offense and was not legally insane at the time of the
commission of the offense.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 314(a) (Purdon 1983) (emphasis added).
Utah law provides that:
If a defendant at trial asserts a defense of "not guilty by reason of insanity," the court
shall instruct the jury that they may find the defendant guilty, not guilty, not guilty by
reason of insanity, guilty and mentally ill, guilty of a lesser offense, or guilty of a lesser
offense due to mental illness but not such illness as would warrant full exoneration.
Upon a verdict of guilty and mentally ill to the offense charged, or any lesser offense,
the court shall hold a hearing as provided in this section, and if the court finds that the
defendant is currently mentally ill, it shall sentence the defendant as a mentally ill
offender.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-21.5 (Supp. 1983).
The Delaware and Illinois statutes are silent as to the circumstances when a judgment of "guilty
but mentally ill" may be rendered.
"" Georgia, Pennsylvania, and South Dakota also require that the proof that a defendant is
"guilty but mentally ill" he beyond a reasonable doubt. GA. Cone ANN. § 17-7-131(c)(2) (Supp. 1985);
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(a) that the defendant is guilty of an offense,
(b) that the defendant was mentally ill at. the time of the commission of that
offense, and
(c) that the defendant was not legally insane at the time of the commission of
that offense. 19
The key to applying this test lies, of course, in the distinction between "mentally ill" and
"insane," Some, but not all, of the GBMI slates provide statutory definitions of "mental
illness" and "insanity" for the guidance - of the trier of fact in determining whether the
defendant is not guilty by reason of insanity, "guilty but menially ill," guilty, or not
guilty.'" Most of these definitions of "mental illness" and "insanity" are so similar,
however, that even a highly sophisticated and thoughtful factfinder would have great
difficulty distinguishing between the two.
Michigan, for example, defines "mental illness" as a "substantial disorder of thought
or mood which significantly impairs judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality, or
ability to cope with the ordinary demands of life.""' The Michigan definition of insanity
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 314(a) (Purdon 1983); S. D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-25-13 (Supp.
1984).
In Alaska and Kentucky, the trier of fact need not be so certain of its GBM I verdict. The Alaska
statute provides that:
To return a verdict of Guilty But Mentally Ill under (a)(4) of this section, the jury must
find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime and find by a
preponderance of the evidence that when the defendant committed the crime the
defendant was guilty but mentally ill as defined in AS 12.47.030.
ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.040(b) (1984).
Under Kentucky law,
[t)he defendant may be found guilty but mentally ill if:
(a) The prosecution proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty
of an offense; and
(b) The defendant proves by a preponderance of the evidence that he was men-
tally ill at the time of the offense.
KY. Ray. STAT. § 504.130(1) (1985).
The Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, and Utah statutes are silent on the standard of proof to be used
in determining whether a defendant is "guilty but mentally ill." DEL. CODE ANN. HI. I f , § 408 (Supp.
1984); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch . 38, 6.2 (Smith-Hurd 1972 & Supp. 1984); IND. CODE. § 35-36-2-3 (1985);
UTAH Cone ANN. § 77-13.1 (Supp. 1983).
"9 MICH. Cow,. LAWS ANN. § 768.36(1) (West 1982); see supra note 117.
l'" Delaware provides only a definition of insanity. DEL. CODE ANN. I/1. 11, § 401 (Supp, 1984)
provides that:
(a) In any prosecution for an offense, it is an affirmative defense that, at the time of the
conduct charged, as a result of mental illness or mental defect, the accused lacked
substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct. If the defendant
prevails in establishing the affirmative defense provided in this section, the trier of facts
shall return a verdict of "not guilty by reason of insanity."
121 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1400a (West 1980).
The Georgia definition of "mental illness" is very similar. Under GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(a)(2)
(Supp. 1985):
"Mentally ill" means having a disorder of thought or mood which significantly impairs
judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality, or ability to cope with the ordinary
demands of life or having a state of significantly subaverage general intellectual func-
tioning existing concurrently with defects of adaptive behavior which originates in the
developmental period. However, the term "mental illness" shall not include a menial
state manifested only by repeated unlawful or antisocial conduct.
Georgia defines "insanity" in accordance with the M'Naghten rule. GA. CODE ANN. § 16 -3 - 2
(1984) declares:
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both incorporates this definition of mental illness and is simultaneously, very similar to it.
The Michigan statute follows the Model Penal Code definition of insanity, declaring that:
A person is legally insane if, as a result of mental illness ... or mental
retardation . . . that person lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the
wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct. to the requirements of
law. W
Similarly, under Indiana law, "mentally ill" is defined as "having a psychiatric disorder
which substantially disturbs a person's thinking, feeling, or behavior and impairs the
person's ability to function „ . [or] having any mental retardation."'" Indiana, like
Michigan, defines insanity by the Model Penal Code test.. 1 G 4
 Kentucky also follows the
Model Penal Code test for insanity,'" but defines "mental illness" as "substantially im-
paired capacity to use self-control, judgment or discretion in the conduct. of one's affairs
and social relations, asiociatcl with maladaptive behavior or recognized emotional symp-
toms where impaired capacity, maladaptive behavior or emotional symptoms can be
related to physiological, psychological or social factors." 2"
Perhaps the slimmest of all distinctions between a defendant who should be acquitted
on grounds of insanity and a defendant who should be found "guilt y but mentally ill" is
drawn by the Alaska and Pennsylvania statutes. The Alaska Code provides that:
[lit is an affirmative defense of insanity that when the defendant engaged in
the criminal conduct, the defendant was unable, as a result. of a mental disease
or defect, to appreciate the nature and quality of that conduct . Evidence
of a mental disease or defect that is manifested only by repeated criminal or
other antisocial conduct is not sufficient to establish the affirmative defense
under (a) of this section.' 27
This definition of "insanity," which is a modern formulation of the M'Naghien rule
combined with part of the ALI test for insanity, is remarkably similar to the Alaska
A person shall not he found guilty of a crime if, at the time of the act, omission, or
negligence constituting the crime, the person did not have mental capacity to distin-
guish between right and wrong in relation to such act, omission, or negligence.
222 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.21a (West 1982). Michigan precludes the assertion of the
insanity defense by one who is voluntarily intoxicated due to the ingestion of drugs or alcohol. Id.
1" 1ND. CODE § 35-36-1-1 (1985).
124 IND. CODE § 35-41-3-6 (1985) provides that:
(a) A person is not responsible for having engaged in prohibited conduct if, as a result
of mental disease or defect, he was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of the
conduct at the time of the offense.
(b) As used in this section, "mental disease or defect" means a severely abnormal
mental condition that grossly and demonstrably impairs a person's perception, but
the term does not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated unlawful or
antisocial conduct.
122 Kentucky law provides for a defense of insanity as follows:
(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct, as a
result of mental disease or defect, he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate
the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.
(2) As used in this chapter, the term "mental disease or defect" does not include an
abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct.
Ky. REV. STAT. § 504.020 (1985); see also Kv. REv. STAT. § 504.060(4) (1985).
1L6
 KY. REV. STAT. § 504.060(5) (1985); see also KY. REv. STAT. § 202A.014 (1985).
"7 ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.010 (1984).
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statute's definition of "guilty but mentally ill," which is taken directly from the ALI
definition of insanity:
(a) A defendant is guilty but menially ill if, when the defendant engaged in
the criminal conduct, the defendant lacked, as it result of a mental disease
or defect, the substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of
that conduct or to conform that conduct to t he requirements of law ... .
(b) Evidence of a mental disease or defect that is manifested only by repeated
criminal or antisocial conduct is not sufficient to establish that the defen-
dant was guilty but mentally ill under (a) of this section,'"
Pennsylvania also defines insanity in accordance with the M'Naghten rule and "men-
tal illness" using the Model Penal Code definition of insanity. Pennylvania law thus
provides the following definitions:
(I) "Mentally ill." One who as a result of mental disease or defect, lacks
substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct
or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.
(2) "Legal insanity." At the time of the commission of the act, the defendant
was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as
not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing or, if he did
know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong.' 29
These two statutes come close to making a distinction without a difference in terms of
the accused's mental state at the time of the offense. To define the requirements for a
verdict of "guilty but mentally ill" in precisely the same terms which most other jurisdic-
tions use to define insanity is an open invitation for the jury to render a verdict of "guilty
but mentally ill" whenever it believes the defendant did suffer from mental illness at the
time of the offense but is concerned about releasing him into the community.
In Illinois, the statutory definition of mental illness is couched in terms that appear to
exclude insanity. The Illinois statute defines "mental illness" as:
a substantial disorder of thought, mood, or behavior which afflicted a person
at the time of the commission of the offense and which impaired that person's
judgment, but not to the extent. that he is unable to appreciate the wrongful-
ness of his behavior or is unable to conform his conduct to the requirements
of law. 13°
Insanity, by contrast, is defined in accordance with the Model Penal Code standard. Yet
even this more substantive distinction provides only limited guidance to the jury as to how
to make the ultimate choice between "mere" mental illness and insanity. 131 As will be
discussed in detail subsequently, some critics of the GBM]. verdict have argued that
129 ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.030 (1984).
129 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 314(c) (Purdon 1983).
130 11.1.. ANN. STAT. ch . 38, § 6-2(d) (Smith-Hurd 1972 Sc . Supp. 1984).
131 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch . 38, § 6-2 (Smith-Hurd 1972 Sc Supp. 1984) provides:
(a) A person is not criminally responsible for conduct if at the time of such conduct, as
a result of mental disease or mental defect, he lacks substantial capacity either to
appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the require-
ments of law.
(b) The terms "mental disease or mental defect" do not include an abnormality man-
ifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct.
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because many of the GBMI statutes' definitions of "insanity" and "mental illness" are
virtually identical, at least from the viewpoint of the average layperson, ii becomes
extremely likely that a jury will reach a compromise verdict of "guilty but mentally ill" in
cases in which the defendant actually meets the statutory test of insanity but has commit-
ted such a reprehensible act that the jury is reluctant to see him return soon to the
community.'•
In addition to a court or jury finding of "guilty but mentally ill," a defendant may also
he found "guilt y but mentally ill" under the statutes if he enters a plea to that effect , 153 As
a general matter, the court may accept the plea after reading the pre-trial psychiatric
reports prepared in response to the defendant's NG1 plea, and after holding a hearing on
the defendant's mental illness. To accept the plea, however, the court must. be "satisfied
that the defendant was mentally ill at the time of the offense."'m The data on the actual
use of "guilty but mentally ill" as a plea are very limited. In Michigan, however, approxi-
mately sixty percent of the GBMI verdicts result front plea bargains, while the remaining
forty percent are divided equally between court and jury trials." a
2. Disposition After a GBMI Verdict
Once a defendant has been found "guilty but mentally ill," the court may sentence
him to prison or probation, just as it would with a defendant who has been found guilty
under a traditional scheme.' 36
 In Michigan and Kentucky, a pre-sent ence psychiatric
1" See infra text accompanying notes 193-232.
la3 DEL. CODE ANN. lit. 11, § 408 (Supp. 1984); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-13 I (g) (Supp. 1985); IND.
CODE § 35.36-2-5 (1985); Ky. RE v. STAT. § 504.130(2) (1985); Micif. Come. LAWS ANN. § 768.36(2)
(West 1982) (quoted supra note 117); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 314(6) (Purdon 1983); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 23A-7-16 (Supp. 1984); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 23A-7-2 (Stipp. 1983); Limit CODE
ANN, § 77-13-1 (Supp. 1983). The Alaska and Illinois statutes are silent about the possibility of a
"guilty but mentally ill" plea.
tal See the particular statutes cited supra note 117.
' 35 Smith and Hall, supra note 2, at 108, Appendix A, Table C.
1" MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.36 (3), (4) (West 1982) provide that:
(3) If a defendant is found guilty but mentally ill or enters a plea to that effect which is
accepted by the court, the court shall impose any sentence which could be imposed
pursuant to law upon a defendant who is convicted of the same offense. If the
defendant is committed to the custody of the department of corrections, he shall
undergo further evaluation and be given such treatment as is psychiatrically indi-
cated for his mental illness or retardation. Treatment may be provided by the
department of corrections or by the department of mental health after his transfer
.... Sections 1004 and 1006 of Act No. 258 of the Public Acts of 1974 shall apply to
the discharge of such a defendant from a facility of the department of mental
health to which he has been admitted and shall apply to the return of such a
defendant to the department of corrections for the balance of' the defendant's
sentence. When a treating facility designated by either the department of correc-
tions or the department of mental health discharges such a defendant prior to the
expiration of his sentence, that treating facility shall transmit to the parole board a
report on the condition of the defendant which contains the clinical facts, the
diagnosis, the course of treatment, and the prognosis for the remission of symp-
toms, the potential for recidivism and for the danger to himself or the public, and
recommendations for future treatment. In the event that the parole board pur-
suant to law or administrative rules should consider him for parole, the board shall
consult with the treating facility at which the defendant is being treated or from
which he has been discharged and a comparable report on the condition of the
defendant shall be filed with the board. If he is placed on parole by the parole
board, his treatment shall, upon recommendation of the treating facility, be made a
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condition of parole, and failure to continue treatment except by agreement with the
designated facility and parole board shall be a basis for the institution of parole
violation hearings.
(4) If a defendant who is found guilty but mentally ill is placed on probation under the
jurisdiction of the sentencing court pursuant to law, the trial judge, upon recom-
mendation of the center for forensic psychiatry, shall make treatment a condition
of probation. Reports as specified by the trial judge shall be filed with the probation
officer and the sentencing court. Failure to continue treatment, except by agree-
ment with the treating agency and the sentencing court, shall be a basis for the
institution of probation violation hearings..The period of probation shall not be for
less than 5 years and shall not be shortened without receipt and consideration of a
forensic psychiatric report by the sentencing court. Treatment shall be provided by
an agency of the department of mental health, or with the approval of the sentenc-
ing court and at individual expense, by private agencies, private physicians, or
other mental health personnel. A psychiatric report shall be filed with the probation
officer and the sentencing court every 3 months during the period of probation. If
a motion on a petition to discontinue probation is made by the defendant, the
probation officer shall request a report as specified from the center for forensic
psychiatry or any other facility certified by department of mental health for the
performance of forensic psychiatric evaluation.
See also People v. McLeod, 407 Mich. 632, 661, 288 N.W.2d 909, 918 (1980) (holding that the
apparent requirement of § 768.36 (4) of a five-year minimum probationary period should be read as
only "presumptive," with the sentencing court being authorized to shorten the ... five-year period
.. if any forensic psychiatric report obtained prior to sentencing or during the period of probation
indicates that a shorter period would be appropriate"). Michigan uses the indeterminate system of
sentencing. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 769.9 (2), (3) (West 1982).
The Indiana statute provides:
(a) Whenever a defendant is found guilty but mentally ill at the time of the crime, or
enters a plea to that effect that is accepted by the court, the court shall sentence him
in the same manner as a defendant found guilty of the offense.
(h) If the defendant who is found guilty but mentally ill at the time of the crime is
committed to the department of correction, he shall be further evaluated and then
treated in such a manner as is psychiatrically indicated for his mental illness.
Treatment may be provided by:
(1) the department of correction; or
(2) the department of mental health after transfer under IC 11-10-4.
(c) If a defendant who is found guilty but mentally ill at the time of the crime is placed
on probation, the court may, in accordance with IC 35-38-2-2, require that he
undergo treatment.
IND. CODE. § 35-36-2-5 (1985).
The Kentucky statute provides:
(1) The court shall sentence a defendant found guilty but mentally ill at the time of the
offense in the same manner as a defendant found guilty. If the defendant is found
mentally ill at the time of sentencing, treatment shall be provided the defendant
until he is no longer mentally ill or until expiration of his sentence, whichever
occurs first.
(2) Treatment shall be a condition of probation, shock probation, conditional dis-
charge, parole or conditional release so long as the defendant is mentally ill.
KY. REV. STAT. § 504.150 (1985).
Georgia law provides:
(g)(1) Whenever a defendant is found guilty but mentally ill at the time of a felony or
enters a plea to that effect that is accepted by the court, the court shall sentence
him in the same manner as a defendant found guilty of the offense. A defendant
who is found guilty but mentally ill at the time of the felony shall be evaluated by
a psychiatrist or a licensed phychologist from the Department of Human Re-
sources after sentencing and prior to transfer to a Department of Corrections
facility. The Board of Human Resources shall develop appropriate rules and
regulations for the implementation of such procedures.
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(2) If the defendant who is found guilty but mentally ill at the time of the felony is
not in need of immediate hospitalization, as indicated by the evaluation, then the
defendant shall be committed to an appropriate penal facility and shall be
further evaluated and then treated, within the limits of state funds appropriated
therefor, in such manner as is psychiatrically indicated for his mental illness.
(3) If at any time following the defendant's transfer to a penal facility it is deter-
mined that a transfer to the Department of Human Resources is psychiatrically
indicated for his mental illness, then the defendant shall be transferred to the
Department of Human Resources pursuant to procedures set forth in regula-
tions of the Department of Corrections and the Department of Human Re-
sources.
(4) If it is determined by the evaluation that the defendant found guilty but mentally
ill at the time of the felony is in need of immediate hospitalization, then the
defendant shall be transferred by the Department of Corrections to a mental
health facility designated by the Department of Human Resources in accordance
with rules and regulations of such departments.
(h) If a defendant who is found guilty but mentally ill at the time of a felony is placed
on probation under the "State-wide Probation Act," Article 2 of Chapter 8 of Title
42, the court may require that the defendant undergo available outpatient medical
or psychiatric treatment or seek similar available voluntary inpatient treatment as a
condition of probation. Persons required to receive such services may be charged fees by the
provider of the service.
GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(g), (h) (Supp. 1985) (emphasis added).
Under the Alaska statute:
(a) If the trier of fact finds that a defendant is guilty but mentally ill, the court shall
sentence the defendant as provided by law and shall enter the verdict of guilty but
mentally ill as part of the judgement.
(b) The Department of Corrections shall provide mental health treatment to a defen-
dant found guilty but mentally ill. The treatment must continue until the defen-
dant no longer suffers from a mental disease or defect that causes the defendant to
be dangerous to the public peace or safety. Subject to (c) and (d) of this section, the
Department of Corrections shall determine the course of treatment.
(c) When treatment terminates under (b) of this section the defendant shall be re-
quired to serve the remainder of the sentence imposed.
(d) Notwithstanding any contrary provision of law, a defendant receiving treatment
under (b) of this section may not be released on furlough or work release under AS
33.30.150, 33.30.250, or 33.30.260 or on parole.
(e) Not less than 30 days before the expiration of the sentence of a defendant found
guilty but mentally ill, the commissioner of corrections shall file a petition under AS
47.30.700 for a screening investigation to determine the need for further treatment
of the defendant if
( I) the defendant is still receiving treatment under (b) of this section; and
(2) the commissioner has good cause to believe that the defendant is suffering
from a mental illness that causes the defendant to be dangerous to the public
peace or safety; in this paragraph, "mental illness" has the meaning given in AS
47.30.915.
ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.050 (1984).
Delaware law provides that:
(b) In a trial under this section a defendant found guilty but mentally ill, or whose plea
to that effect is accepted, may have any sentence imposed on him which may
lawfully be imposed upon any defendant for the same offense. Such defendant
shall be committed into the custody of the Department of Correction, and shall
undergo such further evaluation and be given such immediate and temporary
treatment as is psychiatrically indicated. The Commissioner shall retain exclusive
jurisdiction over such person in all matters relating to security. The Commissioner
shall thereupon confine such person in the Delaware State Hospital. Although such
person shall remain under the jurisdiction of the Department of Correction, deci-
sions directly related to treatment for his mental illness shall be the joint responsi-
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report evaluating the defendant's present mental health is required before seniencing.m
bility of the Director of the Division of Alcoholism, Drug Abuse and Mental Health
and those persons at the Delaware State Hospital who are directly responsible for
such treatment, The Delaware State Hospital, or any other residential treatment
facility to which the defendant is committed by the Commissioner, shall have the
authority to discharge the defendant from the facility and return the defendant to
the physical custody of the Commissioner whenever the facility believes that such a
discharge is in the best interests of the defendant. The offender may, by written
statement, refuse to take any drugs which are prescribed for treatment of his
mental illness; except when such a refusal will endanger the life of the offender, or
the lives or property of other persons with whom the offender has contact.
(c) When the State Hospital or other treating facility designated by the Commissioner
discharges an offender prior to the expiration of such person's sentence, the
treating facility shall transmit to the Commissioner and to the Parole Board a report
on the condition of the offender which contains the clinical facts; the diagnosis; the
course of treatment, and prognosis for the remission of symptoms; the potential for
the recidivism, and for danger to himself or the public; and recommendations for
future treatment. Where an offender under this section is sentenced to the State
Hospital or other facility he shall not be eligible for any privileges not permitted in
writing by the Commissioner (including escorted or unescorted on-grounds or
off-grounds privileges) until the offender has become eligible for parole. Where
the court finds that the offender, before completing his sentence, no longer needs
nor could benefit from treatment for his mental illness, the offender shall be
remanded to the Department of Correction. The offender shall have credited
toward his sentence the time served at the State Hospital or other facility.
DEL. CODE ANN. lit. I I, §§ 408(b), (c) (Supp. 1984).
Further, under Delaware law,
(a) A person who has been adjudged "guilty, but mentally ill" and who during his
incarceration is discharged from treatment may be placed on prerelease or parole
status under the same terms and laws applicable to any other offender. Psychologi-
cal or psychiatric counseling and treatment may be required as a condition for such
status. Failure to continue treatment, except by agreement of the Department of
Correction, shall be a basis for terminating prerelease status or instituting parole
violation hearings.
(b) If the report of the State Hospital or other facility recommends parole, the paroling
authority shall within 45 days or at the expiration of the offender's minimum
sentence, whichever is later, meet to consider the offender's request for parole. if
the report does not recommend parole, but other laws or administrative rules of the
Department permit parole, the paroling authority may meet to consider a parole
request. When the paroling authority considers the offender for parole, it shall
consult with the State Hospital or other facility at which the offender had been
treated, or from which the offender has been discharged.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. I I, § 409 (Supp. 1984).
137 People v. McLeod, 407 Mich. at 660, 288 N.W.2d at 918; KV. REV. STAT. § 504.140 (1985),
which provides that:
If a defendant is found guilty but mentally ill, the court shall appoint at least one (1)
psychologist or psychiatrist to examine, treat and report on the defendant's mental
condition at the time of sentencing.
Id. No other state requires a post-conviction, pre-sentence report, although South Dakota requires a
psychiatric evaluation of the defendant before the defendant is permitted to plead "guilty but
mentally ill."
South Dakota law provides:
if a defendant charged with a felony pleads guilty but mentally ill, the court may not
accept the plea until the defendant has been examined by a licensed psychiatrist and the
court has examined the psychiatric reports. The court shall hold a hearing on the
defendant's mental condition and if there is a factual basis on which the court can
conclude that the defendant was mentally ill at the time of the offense, the plea shall be
accepted.
•
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In many states, if the court determines that probation is appropriate, psychiatric treat-
ment must be made a condition of probation.' 38
If the defendant. is sentenced to prison he will be evaluated to determine if psychiat-
ric treatment is appropriate. 139 There is no guarantee, however, that such psychiatric
treatment will be afforded him. The American Psychiatric Association found in its study
of the GBMI verdict that "in Michigan .. . felons have received no more treatment than
they would have prior to the new law."'" This result. was in fact predicted by one
commentator who noted shortly after the enactment of the GBMI statute that "[elven
before the new verdict, corrections officials were required by statute, upon an individual's
commitment to any of their facilities, to conduct psychological testing and to recommend
particularized placement if shown necessary. ""'
Most of the data presently available on actual treatment afforded the GBM 1 offender
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-7-16 (Supp. 1984).
In Utah, the court is required to conduct a hearing to determine defendant's present mental
state, at which it may consider relevant psychiatric testimony. After receiving this testimony, the
court determines whether commitment to the state mental hospital is appropriate. UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 77-35-21.5 (Supp. 1983). Subsection (4) of that section provides that:
The court shall in its sentence order hospitalization at the Utah state hospital or other
suitable facility if, upon completion of the hearing and consideration of the record, the
court finds by clear and convincing evidence that:
(a) The defendant has a mental illness as defined by section 64-7.28(1);
(b) Because of his mental illness the defendant poses an immediate physical danger to
others or sell, which may include jeopardizing his own or others safety, health, or
welfare if placed in a correctional or probation setting, or lacks the ability to
provide the basic necessities of life, such as food, clothing and shelter, if placed on
probation;
(c) The defendant lacks the ability to engage in a rational decision-making process
regarding the acceptance of mental treatment as demonstrated by evidence of
inability to weigh the possible costs and benefits of treatment;
(d) There is no appropriate treatment alternative to a court order of hospitalization;
and
(e) The Utah state hospital or other suitable facility can provide the defendant with
treatment, care, and custody that is adequate and appropriate to the defendant's
conditions and needs.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-21.5 (4) (Supp. 1983).
Most other states, in contrast, leave the determination of the appropriate psychiatric treatment
to the discretion of the Department of Corrections. See supra notes 133 and 136, and infra notes
138-39.
"8 See, e.g., INn. CODE § 35-36-2-5 (1985); KY. Rev. STAT. § 504.150 (1985); Micit. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 768.36 (4) (West 1982). In Georgia, the court is authorized, but not required, to make
probation conditional on the defendant's receiving psychiatric treatment. GA. Cone ANN. 17-7-
131(h) (Supp. 1985). If the court determines that such treatment is an appropriate condition of
probation, the defendant may be required to pay for it. Id.
'" Some states appear to mandate psychiatric treatment, by using language such as "treatment
shall he provided the defendant until he is no longer mentally ill ...." ALASKA STAT. 12.47.050(h)
(1984); Ky. Ruv. STAT. § 504.150 (1985). Other states appear to demand less, requiring only such
treatment "as is psychiatrically indicated." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 408(6) (Supp. 1984); IND. CODE §
35-36-2-5(b) (1985); Mimi. Come. LAws ANN. § 768.36(3) (West 1982). Georgia holds out the least
promise of treatment of :my state, explicity declaring that the "guilty but mentally ill" offender shall
he given psychiatric evaluation and treatment "within the limits of state funds appropriated there-
for." GA. Cone ANN. § 17-7-131(g)(2) (Supp. 1985).
'" Insanity Defense Work Group, American Psychiatric Association Statement on the Insanity Defense,
140 AM. j. PSYCHIATRY 681, 684 (1983).
"' Schwartz, Moving Backward Confidently: Michigan's New Laws on Criminal Responsibility, Mien.
STATE B.J. 847, 849 (1975) (citing MICH. Com'', Laws ANN. § 791.267 (West 1982) and § 791.68
(repealed 1974)).
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comes from Michigan, which has had the longest experience with a GBMI statute. There,
research by the Michigan Center for Forensic Psychiatry has shown that only fifty percent
of those GBMI defendants sentenced to prison are found by the Depart ment. of Correc-
tions to be either presently mentally ill or probably mentally ill at the time of the
offense. 142 Only these fifty percent are eligible for psychiatric treatment. Those prisoners
found "guilt y but mentally ill" but nor afforded psychiatric treatment often have special
restrictions placed on their freedom of movement within the prison by the prison
administration, and they may be stigmatized by their fellow prisoners as mentally ill
"weirdos,"H" making their adjustment to prison life even more difficult. If, on the other
hand, it is determined that psychiatric treatment is appropriate, in many states such
treatment may be provided by either the department of corrections or the department of
mental health.'" If the GBMI prisoner is treated in prison, the care which he receives is
minimal, because of the extremely small numbers of doctors and nurses available to
provide treatment, and the huge number of inmates requiring treatment. The testimony
of prison psychiatrist Dr. Dennis Jurczak at one GB MI defendant's sentencing hearing is
most. revealing. Dr. Jurczak was "the only full-time psychiatrist. for a prison population of
12,000, although he estimated that at. [Michigan's] Jackson Prison alone there are proba-
bly five to six hundred inmates out of a population' of 5600 who need psychiatric
treatment. ...." 45 Dr. Jurczak testified that there was only one nurse for an in-prison
hospital ward of 100 psychotic or suicidal patients. Accordingly, most of the "treatment."
given these inmates involved "crisis intervention": the administration of pSychotropic
medication and locking acutely disturbed inmates in a room. The other, less severely
mentally ill prisoners were on high dosages of antipsychotic medication, but because of
inadequate psychiatric supervision, there was no way to monitor whether the inmates
were in fact taking the medication, nor was there any attempt to integrate the drug
regimen with other kinds of psychiatric therapy."' Dr. Jurczak summarized his assess-
ment of the treatment. accorded the mentally ill in Michigan's prisons by saying:
They [the mentally ill] are really at the mercy of the rest of the prison
population .... [For this defendant] it would do more harm than good [to
be turned over to the Department of Corrections]. "We do not have the wherewit-
hal to implement the legislation regarding the treatment of mentally ill in the corrections
system. "197
Similar reports of very limited treatment of persons found "guilty but mentally ill" have
been received from other states. "Although data on point are scanty, preliminary reports
from Illinois and Indiana indicate that the treatment promised to recipients of the GBMI
verdict is seldom provided."'" A majority of those found "guilty but mentally ill" in
'42 Blunt and Stock Study, supra note 81. And in another "Michigan study, over 75% of the
defendants found GBMI received no mental treatment and the majority of the others had only
occasional check-ups from a corrections department psychiatrist." Smith and Hall, supra note 2, at
105 n.137.
143 Blunt and Stock Study, supra note 81.
144 GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(g) (Supp. 1985); Ism. CODE § 35-36-2-5(b) (1985); MICH. COMP.
LAws ANN. § 768.36 (3) (West 1982). In Delaware and Utah, GBMI defendants are committed only to
the state mental hospital. DEL. CODE ANN. Lit. 11, § 408(b) (Stipp. 1984); UTAH CODE. ANN. §
77-35-21.5(4) (Supp. 1983). In contrast, in Alaska a GBMI defendant may only be treated within the
facilities of the Department of Corrections. ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.050 (1984).
"5 People a. McLeod, 407 Mich. at 667 n.5, 288 N.W.2d at 921.n.5 (Levin, J., concurring).
"6 Id.
14' Id. (quoting Dr. Jurczak) (emphasis in original).
18 National Center for State Courts, Institute on Mental Disability and the Law, Proposal for
National Institute of Justice funding for "The 'Guilty But Mentally IR' Experiment in Eight States:
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Illinois are housed with the general prison population, with less than forty percent
receiving "treatment" al the sole Department of Corrections hospital. No Illinois GBMI
defendant has ever been committed to the Department of Mental Health. "9 Interestingly,
a proposed GBMI bill in Kansas was "shelved because of the significant capital costs which
the state would incur in providing the mental facilities for t his type of criminal defen-
dant."''"
Even when GBM1 prisoners are given psychiatric treatment in a state mental hospi-
tal,' 5 ' their treatment is only incidental to their punishment. Unlike insanity acquittees,
who must be released from confinement once it is determined that they have recovered
their sanity,'" GBMI prisoners who regain their sanity are returned to the prison
population to serve out the remainder of their prison term.' 53
D. The Guilty But Mentally Ill Statutes Are Unconstitutional
Where does this examination of the structure and actual operation of the GBMI
statutes lead? In this section, it will be argued that the GBMI statutes are unconstitutional,
at least for sonie 'persons convicted under them, in two major respects. First, they fail to
fulfill their promise of providing needed psychiatric treatment to the mentally ill of-
fender, and thus deny the mentally ill defendants who are found "guilty but mentally ill"
their constitutional right to treatment. Second, the laws encourage triers of fact to reach
compromise verdicts by failing adequately to distinguish between "mental illness" and
"insanity," and, at the same time, holding out the illusory promise of combining treat ment
with public protection if the defendant is found "guilty but mentally ill." The substantial
possibility that such a compromise verdict may be reached effectively deprives a defen-
dant of his constitutional right to present an insanity defense, and denies him both the
due process and equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.
I. Denial of the Right to Treatment
In recent years a growing number of state and federal courts have enunciated a
constitutional right to mental health treatment. This right emerged in the early 1970's as
an important check on the power of the state to commit involuntarily persons deemed
mentally ill and dangerous to themselves or others. In the landmark case of Wyatt v.
An Empirical and Descriptive Analysis," at 8 (December 1, 1982) [hereinafter The GBMI Ex-
periment].
According to an article in the Chicago Tribune:
More than half of the prisoners found guilty but mentally ill are scattered throughout
the Illinois prison system's general population, said Stephen Hardy, director of the
Menard Psychiatric Center. No inmate who has been found guilty but mentally ill has
ever been transferred to the Department of Mental Health, he said, and, at present,
only 28 of the 72 inmates incarcerated under the law are housed in the psychiatric
center at Menard, the only prison psychiatric hospital in the state.
Chicago Tribune (Perspective), September 4, 1983, p. 5. See supra note 112.
1" The GBMI Experiment, supra note 148, at 8.
"I The laws of the Delaware, Georgia, Indiana, Michigan, and Utah authorize either the initial
committment or transfer to a state mental hospital of a GBMI defendant. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §
408(b) (Supp. 1984); GA. ANN. CODE § 17-7-131(g) (Supp. 1984); IND. CODE §§ 35-36-2-5(b),
11-10-4-2 (1985); Micut. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.36(3) (West 1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-
21.5(4) (Supp. 1983).
152
 People v. McQuillan, 392 Mich. at 538, 221 N.W.2d at 581; ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.090 (1984);
GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131 (Supp. 1985); INn. CODE § 35-36-2-4 (1985); Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 202A.026,
504.030 (1985); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-14-5 (Supp. 1983).
159 AtAsitA STAT. § 12.47.050(e) (1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 5.408(b), (c) (Supp. 1984); Ky.
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Stickney,' 54 which addressed the treatment rights of the civilly committed mentally re-
tarded and mentally ill, it was held that, "When patients are ... committed for treatment
purposes they unquestionably have a constitutional right to receive such individual
treatment. as will give each of them a realistic opportunity to be cured or to improve his or
her mental condition."' 53 In Rouse v. Cameron, 154' the court invoked constitutional consid-
erations of equal protection and due process to declare, as a matter of statutory construc-
tion, that the District of Columbia statute providing for mandatory commitment of
insanity acquittees should he read to include a "statutory 'right to treatment.'" The court
ruled that mandatory commitment under the statute was "permissible [only] because of its
humane therapeutic goals. Had appellant been found criminally responsible, he could
have been confined a year, at most, however dangerous he might have been. He has been
confined four years and an end is not in sight." 57 The court also noted that "[s]it -ice this
difference rests only on the need for treatment," the government's failure to provide
adequate psychiatric treatment raised possible violations of the due process and equal
protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment, and the cruel and unusual punishment
clause of the eighth amendment."
The Supreme Court, while unwilling to find a general right to treatment of the
mentally 111, 159 has declared that prison inmates are entitled to receive treatment. for their
medical needs. In Estelle v. Gamble,'" the Court found that because "the denial of medical
care may result in pain and suffering which no one suggests would serve any penological
purpose ... we conclude that the deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of
prisoners constitutes the 'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain' . . . proscribed by the
Eighth Amendment."'" 1 Recent cases have held that this right of prisoners to medical
treatment applies equally to prisoners suffering from physical and mental illnesses."'
Against these constitutional requirements, the psychiatric treatment accorded GBMI
prisoners has proven inadequate, if not altogether illusory. First, not all of the GBMI.
statutes expressly guarantee treatment."3 Although some statutes do use mandatory
language, that is, "the defendant shall be treated," others provide only that "the defendant
.. shall undergo further evaluation and be given such treatment as is psychiatrically
Rev. STAT. § 504.150(1) (1985); M ICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.36(3) (West 1982); UTAH CODE ANN. §
77-35-21.5 (Supp. 1983). See also Smith and Hall, supra note 2, at 90.
'" 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
1" Id. at 784.
'" 373 F.2d 451, 455 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
in In Jones v. United States, 466 U.S. 354 (1983), the Supreme Court held that an insanity
acquittee could be confined indefinitely, until he had met the burden of proving that he was no
longer mentally ill or dangerous, even though, if he had been found guilty of the crime charged, his
sentence would have long since expired. A contrary result was reached by the California Supreme
Court in In re Moye, 22'Cal. 3d 457, 584 P.2d 1097, 149 Cal. Rptr. 491 (1978). That court held that
"well established constitutional principles of equal protection require that the duration of institu-
tional confinement of such persons cannot exceed the maximum term for the underlying offense,"
unless the state seeks extended commitment under the civil commitment statute. Id. at 460, 584 P.2d
at 1099, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 493. Similar results have been obtained by legislative action in Oregon, OR.
REV. STAT. § 161.327 (1983); and Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-13 (West 1972 & Supp.
1983).
136
	 F.2d at 453.
7 S9 O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 573 (1975).
' 80
 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976).
161 Id.
152 Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1977); see also Ohlinger v. Watson, 652 F.2d
775, 778-79 (9th Cir. 1980).
' 83 For a discussion of this issue, see supra text accompanying notes 138-39.
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indicated for his mental illness or retardation."'" Yet when the GBMI statute has been
upheld, as it was by the Michigan Supreme Court in People v. McLeod,'" the rationale for
sustaining it. has been that the legislative purpose in creating this new verdict was to assure
supervised mental health treatment and care for persons convicted under the laws of the
state found to be suffering from mental illness."'
Second, an examination of the mental health treatment presently accorded those
liiund "guilty but mentally ill" shows that that legislative purpose has not been fulfilled. As
noted earlier, less than forty percent of the Illinois GBMI defendants, and between
twenty-five and fifty percent of the Michigan GBMI defendants, receive any psychiatric
reatment at all. 1 ti 7 At the same time, however, their freedom of movement within the
prison may be restricted, and they may be stigmatized by the label of "mentally ill" without
having received any of the benefits of psychiatric treatment. 168
 At least one court has
noted that the long-lasting injury to reputation occasioned by being labelled "mentally ill"
• may be even worse than that caused by a criminal conviction alone.' 69 Thus, far from
obtaining special help for their mental problems, these GBMI prisoners are actually worse
off than if they had simply been found guilty.
But even those prisoners who are determined to be suitable candidates for psychiatric
treatment fare poorly. If they arc retained for treatment within the prison, the care they
receive is manifestly inadequate, as was evidenced by the testimony of Michigan prison
psychiatrist Dr. Dennis Jurczak.' 7" No doctor, no matter how dedicated, can give adequate
psychiatric treatment to a population of five to six hundred people. Inevitably, the
psychiatrist must rely heavily on psychotropic medication as a means of limiting and
controlling serious psychiatric breakdowns.' 7 ' Hence, "Noday, drugs are the most com-
mon form of behavior modification and restraint in prisons." 72 This is not to say that
drugs are not an extremely important tool for the psychiatrist to use in treating the
mentally ill. Psychotropic medication has made possible phenomenal advances in psychi-
atric treatment and has frequently been responsible for the cures or remissions of serious
mental illness which would have been unthinkable only thirty years ago. At the same time,
it must be recognized that drugs are an adjunct to psychiatric therapy, not a substitute for
it.
While those GBMI prisoners transferred to a state mental hospital for treatment fare
much better than their confreres who remain in prison, they are still at a disadvantage
when compared to persons acquitted on grounds of insanity. Insanity acquittees must. be
m 1
 Mien. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.36 (3) (West 1982). Similar language is found in the Illinois
statute:
If the court imposes a sentence of imprisonment upon a defendant who has been found
guilty but mentally ill, the defendant shall be committed to the Department of Correc-
tions, which shalt cause periodic inquiry and examination to be made concerning the
nature, extent, continuance, and treatment of the defendant's mental illness. The
Department of Corrections shall provide such psychiatric, psychological, or other
counseling and treatment for the defendant as it determines necessary.
11.1.. A. STAT. ch . 38, § 1005-2-6(b) (Smith-Hurd 1982 & Supp. 1985).
1 '5
 407 Mich. 632, 288 N.W.2d 909 (1980).
' 66 Id. at 663, 288 N.W.2d at 919 (emphasis added).
L 87 See supra notes 142 and 149.
'" Blunt and Stock Study, supra note 81.
'" Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F. Supp. 1039, 1046 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
1 " See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
171 Jarvik, Drugs Used in the Treatment of Psychiatric Disorders, L. GOODMAN & A. CII.MAN, Tow
l'unkmAcoi,oculAt. BASIS OF THERAPEUTICS 133 (1970).
172 Forer, The Prisoner and the Psychiatrist, 31 EMORY L.J. 61, 66-67 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
Forer].
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released as soon as they are found to be sane, while a GBMI prisoner who is restored to
sanity is returned to prison for the remainder of his sentence.
Also unlike insanity acquinees, GBMI prisoners are not eligible for a treatment
program which provides for their gradual reintegration into the community. Yet this type
of step-by-step release is precisely the kind of program which holds out the greatest hope
for the successful maintenance of mental health after discharge. "The therapeutic ideal
calls for allowing patients more and more responsibility for their own actions and judg-
ments, with correlative diminishing restrictions and controls, which inevitably means
accepting greater or less security risk."'" Unfortunately, "therapy and security are largely
inconsistent objectives," and in prison security almost always wins."`
When measured against the constitutional requirement of mental health treatment,
then, the treatment afforded GBMI prisoners is largely inadequate. To the extent that
any GBMI inmate who is in fact presently mentally ill is denied "such individual treatment
as will give him ... a realistic opportunity to be cured or to improve his mental
condition," 175 he is being denied his constitutional right to treatment and is subjected to
cruel and unusual punishment. "It is repugnant . . . to place a seriously mentally infirm or
retarded person in a punitive setting or to impose other forms of punishment."'N Yet
many GBMI defendants receive no psychiatric treatment at all, and, in addition, are
stigmatized by correctional officials and their fellow prisoners as a result of their GBMI
convictions. The testimony of Dr. Jurczak indicates without any doubt that the quality of
care received by the mentally ill in Michigan's prisons receiving treatment is so inadequate
as to "shock the conscience."'"
Indeed, such treatment raises serious ethical questions about the doctors who are
providing this care. 178 Among the Principles of Medical Ethics adopted by the American
Medical Association, two are pertinent here:
The principle objective of the medical profession is to render service to
humanity with respect for the dignity of man. Physicians should merit the
confidence of patients entrusted to their care, rendering to each a full mea:
sure of service and devotion.
A physician should not dispose of his services under terms or conditions
which tend to interfere with or impair the free and complete exercise of his
medical judgment and skill or tend to cause a deterioration of the quality of
medical care. 179
Unquestionably the pressures of practicing medicine in the prison environment
make it extremely difficult for a prison psychiatrist to meet his ethical obligations. Under
the conditions in Michigan's prisons described by Dr. jurczak, it is impossible for the
psychiatrist to "render ... to each [inmate] a full measure of service and devotion."'"
Instead, because of the security needs of the institution, and the overwhelming weight of
' 73 Weihofen, Irotitutional Treatment of Persons Acquitted By Reason of Insanity, 38 TEx. L. REV. 849,
853 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Weiholert].
' 74 Id, at 850, 854.
'75
 Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 784 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
' 7" Gostin, supra note 64, at 107.
'77
	 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (use of stomach pumping to obtain
contents of suspect's stomach "shocks the conscience" and constitutes an illegal seizure).
' 7" Cf. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
' 79 See generally Principles of Medical Ethics, in AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, OPINIONS AND
REPORTS or THE juniciAL COUNCIL (1979) [hereinafter cited as Principles of Medical Ethics].
ISO Id.
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the n umber of seriously mentally ill prisoners, the nature of the psychiatric practice itself
is transformed:'"'
The patient's physical and mental health is subordinated to considerations of
custody. Too frequent. applications for medical or psychiatric service are
interpreted as malingering. Aggressive behavior is punished as an offense,
whereas a therapeutic approach might. regard such behavior as a hopeful
sign. f 8x
Thus the free exercise of the doctor's medical judgment.'" is severely impaired, and the
GBM1 prisoner receives inadequate psychiatric treatment.
When this level of treatment is compared with the type of treatment which the
prisoner would have received had he been found not guilty by reason of insanity, and
thus had been eligible for a gradual, phased reintegration into society as his mental health
improved, there is a violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment's4 Further,
rip has never been determined that sentence-serving convicts suffer from
different mental illnesses from persons who are civilly committed .. • . [S]ince
criminal status is irrelevant to the capability to treat, it. should be irrelevant to
the right to treatment. Mentally ill convicts are entitled to treatment equal to
that received by civilly-committed patients. Whether one compares the statis-
tics on average length of confinement or the relative stigma attaching from
confinement, the inescapable conclusion is that "segregated" treatment of any
class of mental patient in a maximum security facility is inherently unequal,
inherently discriminatory, and inherently unjust.m
Thus, a large number, if not all, of those GBMI prison inmates presently incarcerated
without adequate psychiatric treatment have been denied their fundamental constitu-
tional right to treatment and to the equal protection of the laws, when compared both
with insanity acquittees and with the "civilly" mentally ill.
Yet so far, the various courts who have been asked to rule on this issue have failed to
provide any remedy. Michigan and Indiana courts, for example, have held that the
proper remedy for an asserted denial of the treatment. on which the GRIM statute was
premised is to secure a writ of mandate against t he  Department of Corrections'" or to
bring a federal civil rights action, 1 tl 7 not to declare the statute unconstitutional.'" To date
no writs of mandate have issued.'" In response to their apparent inability to gain relief
from Michigan state courts, a number of GBMI inmates have filed a federal class action
suit, alleging that they have not received the psychiatric evaluation and treatment guaran-
teed by the Michigan GBMI statute, in violation of the due process clause of the four-
'"' Weiholen, supra note 173, at 860 -61.
F Z Id. at 861.
1 " See generally Principles of Medical Ethics, supra note 179.
1" See supra notes 50 and 52 and accompanying text.
1" Morris, "Criminality" and the Right to Treatment, 36 U. Cm. L. REV. 784, 798 (1969).
1 " See,e.g., Studer v. State, 453 N.E.2d 1032, 1036 (Ind. App. 1983); People v. Toner, 125 Mich.
App. 439, 439-41, 336 N.W.2d 22, 23 (1983); People v. Willsie, 96 Mich. App. 350, 354-55, 292
N.W.2d 145, 197 (1980); People v. Tenbrink, 93 Mich. App. 326, 331, 287 N.W.2d 223, 225 (1979);
People v. Soma, 88 Mich. App. 351, 362, 276 N.W.2d 892, 897 (1979).
1 " Stade] . v. State, 453 N.E.2d 1032, 1036 (Ind. App. 1985).
." Id; see also People v. McLeod, 407 Mich. at 655, 288 N.W.2d at 915.
"9 Interim Institute Report, supra note 16, at 46.
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teenth amendment and the eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment. 19"
An Illinois court has expressly ruled that those found "guilty but mentally ill" have no
constitutional right to treatment, since unlike insanity acquittees and other civil com-
mitees, persons found "guilty but mentally ill" are not involuntarily committed at all, but
are being incarcerated as punishment for the crimes they have committed.'" As was
explained by the court: "Persons found guilty but mentally ill ... are incarcerated for
their crimes, not their mental condition."' 92
2. The GBMI Statutes Encourage Unconstitutional Compromise Verdicts
The disparity between the treatment accorded insanity acquittees and the treatment
afforded the GBMI prisoners is particularly striking in light of the very fuzzy distinction
between the two groups made by the GBMI statutes at the trial stage. As noted earlier, the
statutory definitions of "mental illness" and "insanity" are conceptually very close and, to a
considerable degree, overlapping. Thus, Michigan law defines "mental illness" as a "sub-
stantial disorder of thought or mood which significantly impairs judgment, behavior,
capacity to recognize reality, or ability to cope with the ordinary demands of life." 19"
Following the Model Penal Code test, a person is deemed insane "if, as a result of mental
illness ... or mental retardation ... that person lacks substantial capacity either to
appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements
of law."'" But because t here is little distinction between illness that significantly impairs
judgment — menial illness — and illness that impairs a defendant's capacity to appreciate
the wrongfulness of his conduct — insanity' — these definitions in effect "confer upon
the trier of fact unstructured and unlimited discretion to determine whet her an offense
has been committed." 19"
Even more confusing to the jury are the distinctions between "mental illness" and
"insanity" made by Alaska and Pennsylvania law. Under Alaska law, a defendant is
"insane" if, at the time of the offense, he was "unable, as a result of a mental disease or
defect, to appreciate the nature and quality of that conduct," but the defendant is only
"mentally ill" if, at the time of the offense, he lacked "the substantial capacity either to
appreciate the wrongfulness of that conduct or to conform that conduct to the require-
ments of law . . .."'" The distinction made by Pennsylvania law is similarly oblique. In
IN Gorton v. Johnson, 100 F.R.D. 801, 803 (E.D. Mich. 1984). The court has limited the class
action issue to the question of whether the state defendants have:
devised and put into practice a policy, process, and procedure that can adequately give
"further evaluation" and "such treatment as is psychiatrically indicated" to persons who
have been determined to be "guilty but mentally ill" ... and if they have not, is this
failure a violation of due process and the prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment ....
Id. (quoting Mien. Comp. Laws ANN. § 768.36 (West 1982)). As this article went to press, the case was
still in the discovery stage.
"' People v. Marshall, 114 111. App. 3d 217, 223, 448 N.E.2d 969, 980 (1983).
' 9' Id.
Mien. COMP. Laws ANN. § 330.1400a (West 1980).
' 94
 Mien. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.21a (West 1982). Kentucky and Indiana law draw similar
distinctions between "insanity" and "mental illness." See supra notes 123-26.
Robitscher and Haynes, In Defense of the insanity Defense, 31 EMORY L.J. 9, 17 (1982).
196 I 11 People v. Ramsey, 89 Mich, App. 468, 472, 280 N.W.2c1. 565, 566 (1979), the defendant's
argument to this effect was flatly rejected by the court, which stated that "[al reading of the statute
refutes defendant's argument." Id. at 472, 280 N.W.2d at 567.
'" See supra text accompanying notes 127-28.
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that jurisdiction a defendant is "insane" if' "kit the time of the commission of the act, the
defendant was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to
know the nature and quality of the act he was doing or, if he did know it, that he did not.
know he was doing what was wrong." If, however, the defendant, "as a result. of mental
disease or defect, lack[edj substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law," then he is only
"mentally ill."' 98
 By defining "insanity" in accordance with the traditional MN aghten test.
of insanity and "mental illness" in accordance with the Model Penal Code test for
insanity,'" the Alaska and Pennsylvania legislatures have adopted a narrow view of the
circumstances in which an insanity defense is appropriate, 2" and have demonstrated an
evident preference that, when in doubt. about the defendant's mental state at the time of
the crime, the jury should resolve its doubts in favor of the verdict of "guilty but mentally
ill," even though. in many other jurisdictions such a defendant would be legally insane.
Many GBM1 defendants have attacked on equal protection grounds the rationality of
this purported distinction between a state of mental disturbance that renders the defen-
dant "guilty but mentally ill" and mental disturbance sufficient to permit his acquittal on
grounds of insanity. These challenges, however, have been repeatedly rejected by the
courts.'" In People v. Sorna , 2 " 2 for example, a Michigan appellate court declared that the
legislature had acted rationally, based on "a need to make experimental classifications 'in a
practical and troublesome area,' " in establishing "an intermediate category to deal with
situations where a defendant's mental illness does not deprive him of substantial capacity
sufficient to satisfy the insanity test but does warrant treatment in addition to incarcera-
tion."2"3 The court rejected the defendant's argument that the legislative definitions of
"insanity" and "mental illness" amounted to a distinction without a difference, declaring,
"the fact that these distinctions may not appear clear-cut does not warrant a finding of no
rational basis to make them."'" Yet the effect of t his "not ... clear-cut" distinction
between one who was insane at the time of an otherwise criminal act and one who was
"only" mentally ill must be to make it possible, if not likely, for a court or jury to resolve
doubts about. the defendant's insanity by picking the "middle ground" of a GBMI verdict.
This compromise resolution is particularly likely in a jurisdiction like Michigan which
requires that if a jury so requests, it be given an instruction explaining the alternative
dispositions of a defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity and a defendant found
"guilty but menially
'" See supra text accompanying notes 129-31.
'" See supra note 48.
2" See supra text accompanying note 44.
201 See, e.g., Taylor v. State, 440 N.E.2d 1109, 1112-13 (Ind. 1982); People v. Jackson, 80 Mich.
App. 244, 246, 263 N.W.2d 44, 45 ( 97 7).
"2 88 Mich. App, 351, 276 N.W.2d 892 (1979).
2" Id. at 360, 276 N,W.2c1 at 896 (citing McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 270 (1973)).
104 Id,
2" People v. Delaughter, 124 Mich. App. 356, 361, 335 N.W.2d 37, 39 (1983); People v.
Thomas, 96 Mich. App. 210, 222, 292 N.W.2d 523, 528-29 (Mich. App. 1980). Michigan pattern jury
instructions provide two alternative instructions which may be given to the jury concerning the
consequences of an insanity acquittal, and one instruction which addresses the consequences of a
verdict of "guilty but mentally ill." These instructions are as follows:
IForm No.404. Disposition of [Insane] Defendant]
If you find the defendant committed the act but was not criminally responsible at the
time, then he is not guilty by reason of insanity. If you make such a decision, the
defendant will he immediately committed to the custody of the Center for Forensic
Psychiatry for evaluation of his present mental condition.
[Form No. 405. Disposition of (Insane] Defendant (Alternative)]
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Substantial empirical evidence exists to support the likelihood of such juror com-
promise. In Rita James Simon's work with mock juries considering the insanity defense,'"
she found a number of who would have liked the option of finding the defendant
"guilty, but in need of medical treatment ,” 2 " 7 as a way of 'easing the choice between
acquitting the defendant on grounds of insanity and finding him guilty . . . That kind of
verdict would permit the jurors to condemn the defendant's behavior and at the same
time to grant him a special dispensation," distinguishing him from "the ordinary crimi-
nal,"'"8
(1) if you find the defendant committed the act but was not criminally responsible at
the time, then he is not guilty by reason of insanity, if you make such a decision, the
defendant will be immediately committed to the custody for the Center for Forensic
Psychiatry for a period not to exceed sixty days.
(2) During that time, the statute directs that the Center thoroughly examine and
evaluate the present mental condition of the defendant in order to reach an opinion as
to whether he is mentally ill and requires medical treatment.
(3) Within the sixty-day period, the Center will file a report with the Court, prosecuting
attorney and defense counsel. If the report states that the person is not mentally ill or
does not require treatment, the defendant shall be discharged [from custody].
(4) if the report finds that the person is mentally ill and does require treatment, the
Court may [will] direct the prosecuting attorney to file a petition with the Probate Court
for an order of hospitalization or an order of admission to a clinical facility. lithe Court
so directs, the Center may retain the person pending such hearing.
(5) lf, after a hearing before the Probate Court, the defendant is found not to be
mentally ill or not to be a person requiring treatment, the defendant shall be discharged
[from custody].
(6) However, if the person is ordered hospitalized, admitted to a facility or otherwise to
receive treatment, he shall not be discharged or placed on leave without prior consulta-
tion with the Center for Forensic Psychiatry. Once hospitalized, the defendant will be
hospitalized until his mental condition is such that he no longer is judged to require
treatment.
[Form No. 407. Disposition of Defendant Found Guilty but Mentally Ill]
(14) If you find the defendant committed the crime while responsible but mentally ill,
then you may return a verdict of guilty but mentally ill. This verdict may be of the crime
charged [or any lesser included offense].
(15) In most respects a verdict of guilty but mentally ill is the same as a verdict of guilty.
The defendant may be imprisoned for the same period of time as he would if he were
found guilty. [Alternatively, he could be placed on probation for a period of time the
same as or greater than he would be if found guilty.) The distinction is that the verdict
of guilty but mentally ill imposes upon the Department of Corrections an obligation to
provide appropriate psychiatric treatment during the period of imprisonment or while
the defendant is on probation.
G. GILLESPIE, 2 MicuinAN CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 380-82 (2d ed. 1978 & 1984 Cumulative
Supplement).
Alaska goes one step further than Michigan and requires that the jury be advised of the
alternative dispositions of a defendant found "guilty but mentally ill" and a defendant found "not
guilty by reason of insanity." ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.040(c) (1984). Pennsylvania also requires that the
jury be instructed on the consequences of an insanity acquittal. Commonwealth v. Mulgrew, 475 Pa,
271, 277-78, 380 A.2d 349, 352 (1977).
2°6 To avoid the constitutional questions which would be raised by invading the sanctity of the
jury room, Simon used jurors drawn from actual jury rolls in Chicago, St. Louis, and Minneapolis.
The juries heard tapes of an insanity defense trial. The trials varied in the definition of insanity
employed, the detail of psychiatric testimony presented, and in whether or not the jury was told the
consequences of conviction and acquittal. R. Si moN, THE JURY AND THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY 213-14
(1967) [hereinafter cited as R. Stmcm],
207 Id. at 96.
"8 Id. at 178.
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Sinion's work has been borne out in the real world as well. In United Slates v. Pairick, 2"
the defendant was charged with first degree murder in the stabbing death of his mother.
His defense was insanity due to LSD-induced hallucinations. After deliberating for nearly
a day, the jury informed the court that it was deadlocked, with ten jurors in favor of a
verdict of guilty, and two jurors in favor of a not guilty by reason of insanity verdict.
Mier the court urged the jury to continue its deliberations in hopes of reaching agree-
ment,`S 0
 the jury asked the court if it could "'make a recommendation of psychiatric
treatment for the defendant along with a verdict of murder in the second degree.' "a'
The court stated that. it could. Fifteen minutes later the jury rendered such a verdict. In
reversing the defendant's conviction, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeal focused on the
critical importance of keeping separate the questions of a defendant's criminal responsi-
bility and the appropriate disposition if he was found responsible. The court stressed that
"where the sole issue tin a case] is the question of criminal responsibility, the potential for
undermining a jury verdict by allowing a recommendation of psychiatric treatment is
obvious." The court emphasized that the judgment made in an insanity case is a moral one
—"whether a person was sufficiently able to control his behavior so that he may justly be
held responsible for committing an anti-social act." According to the court, a jury inquiry
into the consequences of a particular verdict would undermine their ability to make that
moral judgment, and thus would he inappropriate.L 1 "
Courts have also frequently recognized the difficulty which jurors may have in
acquitting a defendant on grounds of insanity when he has committed a particularly
heinous act.. 213
 The difficulty that a trier of fact may have in properly assessing whether
the defendant was "merely" mentally ill or truly insane at the time of the offense is
compounded by the passage of time and the frequent use of psychiatric treatment,
including psychotropic drugs, to "stabilize a mentally ill defendant so that he is calm
enough to be found competent to stand trial."'" Thus, by the time these defendants do
stand trial, they often convey at least the appearance of normality, making it more
2" 494 F.2d 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
2 '° Id. at 1153. The court instructed the jury in accordance with the now-disfavored "Allen"
charge. Id. at 1153, n.4.
2 " Id. at 1153 (quoting trial court transcript at 531).
2 " Id. at 1154 (footnotes omitted).
.213 See,e.g., United States v. Bennett, 460 F.2d 872, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Cf. Beck v. Alabama,
447 U.S. 625, 627 (1980) (court struck down Alabama's death penalty statute, which prohibited the
jury from being instructed on the crime of felony murder as a lesser included offense of robbery-
intentional murder, which carried a mandatory penalty of death). In Beck, the court commented
upon the reality of jury concern with letting dangerous individuals escape all criminal responsibility:
Jurors are not expected to come into the jury box and leave behind all that their human
experience has taught them. The increasing crime rate in this country is a source of
concern to all Americans. To expect a jury to ignore this reality and to find a defendant
innocent and thereby set him free when the evidence established beyond doubt that he
is guilty of some violent crime requires of our juries clinical detachment from the reality
of human experience . .....
447 U.S. at 642 (citing Jacobs v. State, 361 So. 2d 640, 657-62 (Ala. 1978) (Shores, j., dissenting), ceri.
denied, 439 U.S. 1122 (1979)).
Turner and Ornstein, supra note 2, at 43. This problem of "synthetic sanity" has recently
prompted several state supreme courts to hold that a defendant may not be forcibly medicated in
order to be competent to stand trial if to do so would deprive the jury of the opportunity to observe
his demeanor as it was at the time of the offense. See, e.g, Commonwealth v. Louraine, 390 Mass. 28,
36-37, 453 N.E.2d 437-46 (1983); State v. Hayes, 118 N.H. 458, 389 A.2d 1379, 1382 (1978).
May 1985]	 GUILTY BUT MENTALLY ILL	 639
difficult for them to persuade a court or jury of their insanity at the time of the offense.
"When the defendant is on drugs, the jury never gets to see him as he was at the time of
the incident in question, or as he was when the psychiatrist examined him out of court."" 5
The combination of all these factors — the lack of a clearly articulated distinction
between mental illness and insanity, the defendant's potentially misleading demeanor at
trial, and the conflicting desires of the trier of fact to provide treatment and at the same
time keep violent individuals off the streets — can easily lead a court or jury to elect the
GBMI verdict even when substantial evidence is presented of the defendant's insanity. 216
This verdict is attractive because, by convicting the defendant, the jury can condemn his
behavior and keep a possibly dangerous individual in custody. The jury may believe,
however, that by also finding the defendant mentally ill, their verdict will ensure special
treatment and will carry a lesser stigma than a regular "guilty" verdict. 2 "
It is axiomatic that there is a fundamental distinction between therapy and punish-
Melli :
Therapy is not a response to person who is at fault . . Therapy is normally
associated with compassion for what one undergoes, not resentment for what
one has illegitimately done ....
[W]ith therapy, unlike punishment, we do not seek to deprive the person
of something acknowledged as a good, but seek rather to help and to benefit
the individual who is suffering by ministering to his illness in the hope that
the person can be cured ....
[Title conceptions of "paying a debt" or "having a debt forgiven" or
pardoning have no place in a system of therapy. 218
Under the GBMI verdict, the distinction between therapy and punishment is impermissi-
bly blurred. The fact that the GBMI verdict comes into play only when a defendant
invokes the insanity defense, and is not made applicable to defendants who do not assert
mental incapacity as a defense to a crime although they may in fact he mentally ill, is
evidence of a legislative purpose to punish, rather than treat, individuals who assert a
defense of insanity. 2 ' 9 The GBM1 statute accomplishes the police power goal of keeping
dangerous people off the streets, but disguises t.his purpose in the rhetoric of treatment.
The GBM1 verdict's "moral sleight-of-hand""" improperly confuses treatment with pun-
ishment, and makes it possible for judges and juries to opt for a GBMI verdict, rather
than a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity, under the mistaken impression that they
will thereby guarantee psychiatric treatment, as well as lengthy incarceration, for the
mentally ill offender.
Currently available data on the possibility of this type of jury compromise is
equivocal. In Michigan, the number of insanity acquittals has remained relatively constant
before and after the enactment of the GBMI verdict. Between 1967 and 1974 an average
" 5 Turner and Ornstein, supra note 2, at 43.
2" Judge Barrington Parker, who presided over the Hinckley trial, has assailed the "guilty but
mentally ill" verdict as "'an open invitation to the jury to return a compromise verdict ....' " Lauter,
A Reform of the Insanity Plea Likely, 5 NAT'L L. J. 5 (April 25, 1983) (quoting Judge Parker).
2 " Grostic, The Constitutionality of Michigan's Guilty But Mentally 111 Verdict, 12 J.L. REFORM 188,
196 (1978).
216 H. MORRIS, ON GUILT AND INNOCENCE 38-39 (1976).
2 " See supra text accompanying note 112.
22° ABA, Report to the House of Delegates, supra note 62, at 9.
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of forty persons was acquitted on grounds of insanity each year, although there were
seventy-eight in 1974, the year before the GBMI verdict was enacted."' In 1975, the first
year in which the GBMI verdict was law, the number of insanity acquittals fell to
thirty-three, 22 but since then it has risen to an average of fifty-four per year for the
period 1976-1982." 3 Given that only forty percent of the GBMI verdicts are the result of
a trial, and that the number of successful insanity pleas has been fairly constant before
and after the passage of the GBMI law, it has been argued that the GBMI verdict has not
undercut the ability of criminal defendants to present a successful' insanity defense.'"
This argument, however, overlooks two critical factors. First, the legal definition of
insanity was itself changed in 1975, from a variation of M'Naghten 225 plus "irrestible
impulse""" before the GBMI verdict. was enacted, to the A.L.I. Model Penal Code
definition" 7 thereafier. 22 ' Second, the number of pre-trial referrals for psychiatric evalua-
tion of defendants who wished to assert an insanity defense skyrocketed alter 1975,"''
rising from 401 in 1976 to 1,122 in 1980. 23" Both these factors —a more liberal definition
of insanity and a much greater number of defendants asserting an insanity defense and
receiving a pre-trial psychiatric evaluation — would lead to a prediction of an increase in
the number of insanity acquittals,"' Thus, the sharp reduction in the number of insanity
"' Criss and Racine, supra note 2, at 265.
221 Id.
223
 Smith and Hall, supra note 2, at 93, 107.
2" Id. at 93, 100-01.
m See supra note 41.
226 The "irresistable impulse" test embodies the idea that the defendant "lacks sufficient will
power to resist the impulse to commit the charged act, by reason of mental unsoundness," and is used
as a supplement to the M'Naghten rule in a number of jurisdictions. A. DEUTSCH, THE MENTALLY ILL
IN AMERICA 397 (2d ed. 1949).
Prior to 1975, the test for insanity in Michigan was stated thus:
"[W]hether or not he [the defendant] exhibited evidences which leave a reasonable
doubt in your minds of the soundness of his mind in that transaction. Did he know what
he was doing, — whether it was right or wrong? and if he did, then did he know or did
he have the power, the will power, to resist the impulse occasioned?"
People v. Durfee, 62 Mich. 487, 494, 29 N.W. 109, 112 (1886), cited in People v. Martin, 386 Mich.
407, 416, 192 N.W.2d 215, 219 (1971). As explained by the court in Martin, "The Michigan test
encompasse[d] „ not only a sudden overpowering, irresistable impulse but any situation or condi-
tion in which the power, 'the will power' to resist, is insufficient to restrain commission of the
wrongful act." 386 Mich. at 418, 192 N.W.2d at 220.
'" 386 Mich. at 418, 198 N.W.2d at 220. See supra note 48.
225 See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
226 Michigan GBMI Verdict, supra note 109, at 256. Such pre-trial evaluations were made man-
adatory by the legislature in the same year that it enacted the GBMI verdict. Id.
'-3° Id.
23 ' Although there is no experimental data available comparing the frequency of NGI verdicts
under the ALI and M'Naghten plus "irresistable impulse" formulas, there is such data comparing the
results when the M'Naghten and Durham tests were used. The Durham test is, of course, the rule set
forth in Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 874.75 (D.C. Cir. 1954), see supra notes 46 -47. In
THE JURY AND THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY, Simon found that experimental jurors were twelve percent
more likely to vote for acquittal under the Durham rule than the M'Naghten test. R. SIMON,SUpra note
206, at 216. In addition, data from the District of Columbia show that in the seven years after Durham
was decided in 1954, there was "a fifteen-fold increase in the proportion of defendants who were
acquitted on grounds of insanity." Id. at 204. While there is certainly a difference between the
terminology used in Durham and the ALI tests, it is generally thought that both are more liberal in
their conception of insanity than the M'Naghten rule. The addition of the "irresistable impulse"
concept in the old Michigan test would not be likely to have significantly narrowed the difference
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acquittals in the year that the GBMI law became effective, and, indeed, the low numbers
of insanity acquittals during the two following years:232
 strongly suggests that the GB MI
option has in fact undermined the ability of defendants to make out a case of insanity.
What is even more important than this data in t he aggregate, however, is the effect in
a particular trial of the presence of the GBMI verdict as a choice for the court or jury. For
since, as will be demonstrated, the insanity defense is constitutionally required, then in any
case in which the defendant's ability to present a successful insanity defense is undercut by
the meretricious lure of the GBMI verdict, and he is in fact found "guilty but mentally ill"
rather than not guilty by reason of insanity', he has been denied his constitutional right to
due process of law.
III. THE INSANITY DEFENSE IS CONSTITUTIONALLY REQUIRED
Whether or not the verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity is constitutionally
mandated has been discussed infrequently by courts and legal scholars. The Supreme
Court has never directly addressed this issue; however, five of the six state courts that.
have considered the constitutional basis of the insanity defense have found it to be
constitutionally compelled.
Those Supreme Court decisions that have discussed the insanity defense have fo-
cused on its procedural aspects. In Davis v. United States, 233 the Supreme Court reversed a
defendant's murder conviction on the ground that the jury was not instructed that if it
had a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's sanity at the time of the offense it must
acquit him. In so reversing, the Supreme Court appeared to assume, although it did not
expressly state, that the insanity defense was constitutionally required, because "the crime
of murder necessarily involves the possession by the accused of such mental capacity
[sanity] as will render him criminally responsible for his acts." 234
In Leland v. Oregon ,z 33 however, the Supreme Court characterized the Davis decision
as merely "the rule to be followed in federal courts," without constitutional underpin-
nings:a' and held that a state could constitutionally require a defendant to prove his
insanity beyond a reasonable doubt without running afoul of the due process clause of t he
fourteenth amendment. The Leland Court did not address the question whether the
insanity defense itself is constitutionally mandated . 237
Most recently, in Ake v. Oklahorna,"" the Court held that. the fourteenth amendment.'s
guarantee of fundamental fairness in criminal trials required that psychiatric assist ance be
provided an indigent defendant asserting an insanity defense. Specifically, the Court held
between the M'Naghten and A.L.I. results, since the Michigan test retained the essential cognitive
emphasis of the M'Naghten rule.
11 Criss and Racine, supra note 2, at 265; Smith and Hall, supra note 2, at 107, Appendix A,
Table A.
'33 160 U.S. 469 (1895).
234 Id. at 985.
r'S 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
"" Id, at 797.
837 Id. at 800. In Rivera v. Delaware, 429 U.S. 877 (1976), the Supreme Court dismissed, for
want of a substantial federal question, an appeal from a defendant convicted of second degree
murder who challenged the Delaware law which made insanity an affirmative defense. Justice
Brennan, dissenting, argued that because sanity is an essential aspect of the requirement of Mens rea,
it must he proved by the state beyond a reasonable doubt. 429 U.S. at 878-79 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (citing/7i re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), and Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975)).
278 105 S. Ct. 1087 (1985).
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that such a defendant must be provided, at stale expense, with a psychiatrist to examine
him and testify at trial concerning his mental state at t he time of the offense.'" The Court
held that. such expert assistance was constitutionally mandated for two reasons. First, the
Court held that the state has no interest in convicting a defendant if in fact he was insane
at the time of the crime.'" Second, the Court found that. without the benefit of expert
psychiatric testimony concerning the defendant's mental state the risk of an inaccurate
resolution of sanity issues is extremely high."' Together these two factors led the Court. to
conclude that., "unlike a private litigant, a State may not legitimately assert an interest in
maintenance of a strategic advantage over the defense, if the result of that advantage is to
cast. a pall on the accuracy of the verdict obtained. " 242
Despite the Supreme Court's failure to address directly the question of whether the
insanity defense is constitutionally compelled, a strong argument can be made that it is so
compelled, as part of our fundamental "concept of ordered liberty," 243 and that therefore
any statute or rule of criminal procedure undercutting a defendant's right to present an
insanity defense is unconstitutional. To appreciate this contention, it is necessary to put
the insanity defense in its proper historical and jurisprudential context.
At the heart of the criminal law is the principle that moral blameworthiness is an
essential predicate to legal responsibility. The requirement of moral blameworthiness
finds expression in the concept of mens reit,'" a prohibited mental state, and in the notion
of a voluntary aci.,245 the actus reus, 246 which is also an essential element of every crime. An
examination of the structure of the criminal law as a whole reveals that the insanity
defense describes but one of the many situations in the criminal law in which a person
who does an act prohibited by a penal statute is not held responsible for the commission of
that act, because his conduct is either excused or justified. just as a person acting under
mistake of fact. is not held liable if that mistaken belief precluded him from forming t he
requisite mental state required for a particular crime,' just as a person acting under
duress is not held criminally responsible,"" and just as a person who shoots another in
self-defense is not liable,'" so too the insanity acquittee is exempted from a criminal
penalty for his admittedly unlawful act because he lacked the moral blameworthiness
necessary to Convict.
Even the defense of provocation, which will, in most jurisdictions, reduce a homicide
from murder to manslaughter despite the accused's intent. to kill or cause great bodily
"9 Id. at 1092.
240 Id. at 1094 -95.
"' Id. at 1096.
242
 Id. at 1095.
243 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
244 See supra note 27.
245 See, e.g., People v. Newton, 8 Cal. App. 3d 359, 376, 87 Cal Rptr. 394, 403 (1970); MODEL
PENAL. Com: § 2.01(1) (1982).
249 The actus reus is a voluntary act or omission (under circumstances in which one has a legal
duty to act) which is an essential element of every crime. A person is not blameworthy if he does not
commit a prohibited act or omission. Under our criminal law one may not be punished for evil
thoughts alone. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01 (1982); S. KAD15H, S. SCHULHOFER, & M. PAULSON, Supra
note 27, at 257-59.
"7 See, e.g., People v. Mayberry, 15 Cal. 3d 143, 154, 542 P.2d 1337, 125 Cal. Rptr. 745, 752
(1975); MODEL PENAL. CODE § 2.04 (1982).
"9 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 (1982).
2+9
 See, e.g., State v. Wanrow, 88 Wash. 2d 221, 235-36, 559 P.2d 548, 556 (1977); MODEL. PENAL
CODE § 3.04 (1982).
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harm to the victim,'" is based upon the fundamental principle of free will and moral
blameworthiness. The provocation of the victim reduces the seriousness of the defen-
dant's crime because it is believed that due to these provoking circumstances, circum-
stances to some degree outside his control, he is less blameworthy than one who kills
without such provocation. 25 ' So too in the case of the insanity acquittee, circumstances
beyond his control, alt hough they occur within his own. mind, make it inappropriate to
impose blame for his conduct.
All -of the tests for insanity, from M'Naghten to the Model Penal Code, 252 are predi-
cated on this fundamental principle of blameworthiness, that a person ought not to be
held responsible if his conduct was not. the result of his exercise of free will or a conscious
choice to do wrong. Each test is an attempt to give a definition of that involuntariness, of a
lack of ability to choose, which, it is thought, appropriately excludes from responsibility
those who could not elect. to do light or wrong, those who did not exercise their free will
in embarking upon a criminal course of conduct.
Thus, to say that the insanity defense is an anomaly in the grand scheme of our
criminal law is simply wrong. To the contrary, our criminal justice system requires moral
blameworthiness for every act subject to criminal sanction, save those which have been
made strict liability offenses. "The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only
when inflicted by intention is ... as universal and persistent. in mature systems °flaw as
belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal
individual to choose between good and evil." 253 This principle, that moral blameworthi-
ness is an essential predicate to a criminal conviction, was established early in English
common law, 224 and was carried over into the laws of the colonies and the new republic,
even without express statutory enunciation.' 55
It is not surprising, then, that all but one of the six state courts which have considered
the constitutional basis of the insanity defense have found it to be constitutionally re-
2" See, e.g., Maher v. People, 10 Mich. 212 (1862); Director of Public Prosecutions v. Camplin,
House of Lords, [19781 2 All E.R. 168; MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 (1982).
The defense of manslaughter is designed for those "cases of intentional homicide where the
situation is as much to blame as the actor." MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 comment (1982). Put another
way, "the greater the provocation ... the more ground there is for attributing the intensity of the
actor's passions and his lack of self-control „ , to the extraordinary character of the situation in which
he was placed rather than to any extraordinary deficiency in his own character." Michael and
Wechsler, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 1261, 1281-82 (1937). Both these
sources are cited in S. RADISH, S. SCHULHOFER, & M. PAULSEN, supra note 27, at 439-41.
252 See supra text accompanying notes 41-48.
2" Morrisette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952); accord, Durham v. United States, 214
F.2d 862, 876 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
254 See supra text accompanying notes 23-33.
"5 As the Supreme Court noted in 'Morrisette v. United States:
Crime, as a compound concept, generally constituted only from concurrence of an
evil-meaning mind with an evil-doing hand, was congenial to an intense individualism
and took deep and early root in American soil. As the states codified the common law of
crimes, even if their enactments were silent on the subject, their courts assumed that the
omission did not signify disapproval of the principle but merely recognized that intent
was so inherent in the idea of the offense that it required no statutory affirmation.
Courts, with little hesitation or division, found an implicaton of the requirement as to
offenses that were taken over from the common law.
342 U.S. at 251-52 (footnotes omitted). Some states have explicitly adopted the common law of
England as controlling precedent so long as it does not conflict with existing federal or state statutes
or constitutional provisions. See, e.g. , UTAH CODE § 68-3-1 (1978).
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quired, recognizing it as an aspect of the fundamental fairness guaranteed by the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment or comparable state constitutional provi-
sions. In State v. Stra,sberg, for example, the Washington Supreme Court declared that a
state law which eliminated insanity as a defense was violative of the defendant's right to
due process of law and his right to jury trial, both of which were guaranteed by the
Washington constitution. The court rejected the prosecution's therapeutic justification
for the elimination of the insanity defense, namely that "because of modern humane
methods in caring for ... those convicted of crime, there is no longer any reason for
taking into consideration the element of will on the part of those who commit prohibited
acts, when their guilt is being determined for the purpose of restraint and treat-
ment.." 257
 Instead, the court held that the insanity defense was an essential part of the
common law of England and America, a necessary concomitant of the criminal law's mens
rea requirement and of the defendant's right to trial by jury, and thus could not constitu-
tionally he abrogated by the legislature. 258
Likewise, in Sinclair v. State,'" the Mississippi Supreme Court struck down a slate
statute which eliminated insanity as a defense to murder, but provided that evidence of
insanity could be offered to support a verdict of "guilty but. insane," which would
reduce the sentence for murder from death to life imprisonment. The court held that the
law violated the Mississippi Constitution's due process clause, which provides: " 'No
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property except by due process of law.' "!60 In
addition, one concurring justice found the new law to violate the due process and equal
protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions,' and the constitutional prohibi-
tion against cruel and unusual punishment, on the ground that it was cruel to subject an
insane person to life imprisonment. 262
The Louisiana Supreme Court has held that the insanity defense is constitutionally
required in two cases. In the early case of State v. Lange , 2 ' 3
 the court struck down a stale
statute which withdrew the question of the determination of insanity from t he courts to a
lunacy commission composed of the superintendents of Louisiana's state mental hospitals.
The court held this statute to violate provisions of the state constitution which gave
exclusive jurisdiction of criminal cases to the courts and which guaranteed the right. to
trial by jury. In a second case almost fib y years later the court found that juveniles had a
constitutional right to present an insanity defense."' According to the court, "the denial
"6
 60 Wash. 106, 110 P. 1020 (1910).
Id. at 123, 110 P. at 1025.
259
 Id. at 112-15, 110 P. at 1021-23. See also Morrisette, 342 U.S. at 250, and Murray's Lessee v.
Hoboken Land and Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 276-77 (1855). In Murray's Lessee the Supreme
Court held that in determining whether a legislative enactment violates due process of law, courts
"must look to those settled usages and modes of proceeding existing in the common and statute law
of England, before the emigration of our ancestors, and which are shown not to have been unsuited
to their civil and political condition by having been acted on by them after the settlement of this
country." 59 U.S. at 277.
"9
 161 Miss. 142, 132 So. 581 (1931).
"° Id. at 153, 132 So. at 582 (quoting MISS. CONST. OF 1890, § 14).
1 ti 1 Id. at 164-71, 132 So. at 586-88 (Ethridge, J., concurring). He found that the equal protection
clause had been violated since a defendant who lacked malice aforethought, the mental state
required for murder, could he found guilty only of manslaughter, which carried a maximum term of
twenty years, while an insane defendant, who lacked all necessary rnens rea, could he sentenced to
life imprisonment, Id. at 167, 132 So. at 587 (Ethridge, J., concurring).
"' Id. at 161, 132 So. at 584 (Ethridge, J., concurring).
°r3
	 1,a. 958, 966, 123 So, 639, 642 (1929).
'264 In re Causey, 363 So. 2d 472 (La. 1978).
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of the right to plead insanity, with no alternative means of exculpation or special treat-
ment for an insane person unable to understand the nature of his act, violates the concept
of fundamental fairness implicit in the due process guaranties." 295
The Minnesota Supreme Court has also held that the right of a defendant to assert an
insanity defense is guaranteed by the due process clauses of both the state and federal
constitutions."6 In State v. Hoffman, the court found that a criminal defendant has a
fundamental right to present an insanity defense, and that this right was not impaired by
jury instructions which permitted the jury to consider evidence of the defendant's mental
state solely to -determine if the M'Naghten test of insanity was satisfied. 267
Only in the case of State v. Korell 2 " 8 did a state supreme court uphold a legislative
abolition of the insanity defense. In Km-ell, the Montana Supreme Court rejected the
defendant's challenge to the Montana legislature's elimination of the "traditional" defense
of insanity. In so ruling, the court placed heavy emphasis on the provisions in the relevant
statute requiring the consideration of the defendant's mental state at the time of the
offense, both at the trial, under the rubric of mens rea,ws and at sentencing, where the
court was required to evaluate the defendant's mental state at the time of the crime in
accordance with the Model Penal Code test of insanity and commit him to "an appropriate
institution for custody, care, and treatment" if he was insane at that time.'"
Except for Korell then, in every case in which a state court. has considered whether the
insanity defense is constitutionally compelled, the court has held that the insanity defense
is constitutionally required as a necessary concomitant of either the right to due process of
law or the right to jury trial. Such a conclusion seems inescapable. The insanity defense
has historically been an integral aspect of the criminal law'S requirement of moral
blameworthiness as a precondition to the imposition of a penal sanction.' n The right to
assert an insanity defense in a criminal trial must be recognized as a liberty interest "'so
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental,' "2"
and therefore, entitled to the protection of the due process clause.'"
265 Id. at 474.
266 State v. Hoffman, 328 N.W.2d 709 (Minn. 1982).
267 328 N.W.2d at 715.
269 —, Mont.	 690 P.2d 992 (1984).
"9 Id. at	 690 P.2d at 1000.
Id. at	 690 P.2d at 997.
271 See supra text accompanying notes 23-33.
272 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 487 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting
Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
273
	
Goldberg stated in Griswold that "the concept of liberty protects those personal rights
that are fundamental, and is not confined to the specific terms of the Bill of Rights." 381 U.S. at 486
(Goldberg, J., concurring). In agreeing with the Court's striking down of a Connecticut statute which
prohibited physicians from prescribing contraceptive devices to married women, Justice Goldberg
relied heavily on the ninth amendment's express provision that, "The enumeration in the Constitu-
tion, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." Id.
at 488 (Goldberg, J., concurring). He noted that the amendment had been added to the Bill of Rights
to quiet "fears that a bill of specifically enumerated rights could not be sufficiently broad to cover all
essential rights and that the specific mention of certain rights would he interpreted as a denial that
others were protected." Id. at 488-89 (Goldberg, J., concurring). Just as with the case of the right of
marital privacy deemed fundamental in Griswold, so too is the right of a criminal defendant to
present a defense which goes to the question of his moral blameworthiness, his ability to choose to do
good or evil, a fundamental liberty right which must be found to be constitutionally based, despite its
lack of specific enumeration in the Constitution. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148-55
(1968) (historical analysis of the role of trial by jury in the Anglo-American criminal law demon-
strated its fundamental importance in safeguarding the essential liberty interest of criminal defen-
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The GBMI verdict undercuts a defendant's right to present an insanity defense just
as surely as did any of the state statutes struck down in Lange, Sinclair, or Strasberg.
Established in an attempt to reach people who would otherwise "fall through the cracks of
the criminal justice system" by virtue of an insanity acquittal, 274 the GBMI statutes provide
vague and deliberately confusing definitions of the distinction between being "insane"
and "mentally ill," and at the same time make it extremely attractive to the trier of fact to
return a GBMI verdict instead of a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity, by holding
out the twin promises of incarceration and treatment. "A judge [or juror] can satisfy the
demands of the press and the public to get the criminals off the street and at the same
time salve his conscience with the belief that he is helping the offender by .. , sending him
to prison for the purpose of treatment or cure." 275 But, as shown earlier, the promise of
treatment for GBMI prisoners has been unfulfilled, leaving incarceration and the protec-
tion of public safety as the only purpose actually served by the GBMI verdict. While
protection of the public is a reasonable goal — and indeed was one of the major functions
of the insanity defense until ien or fifteen years ago — it is constitutionally impermissible
to achieve it. by depriving criminal defendants of both a meaningful right to present an
insanit.y defense and the right to treatment. "To deprive any citizen of his or her liberty
upon the altruistic theory that the confinement is for humane and therapeutic reasons,
and then fail to provide adequate treatment, violates the very fundamentals of due
process." 275 Thus, the GBMI verdict is unconstitutional, violating a criminal defendant's
constitutional right to due process and equal 'protection of the laws, and denying a
convicted offender his right to adequate psychiatric treatment.
IV. CONDITIONAL RELEASE AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE GUILTY
BUT MENTALLY ILL STATUTES
Much of the recent animosity toward the insanity defense has been expressed in the
idea that insanity acquittees are in some way "getting off," escaping liability for the
punishment they so richly deserve through the legal loophole of the insanity defense. The
impetus for the enactment of the GBMI statutes was a growing public concern that
persons found not guilty by reason of insanity were being released prematurely, without
an adequate assessment either of their mental competence or, more significantly, of their
potential for dangerous criminal actions in the future. The GBMI statutes were passed in
an effort, to reduce the number of persons found not guilty by reason of insanity and
thereby, presumably, to protect the public. But, as pointed out above, the GBMI statutes
represent. a misguided and constitutionally defective attempt to deal with the relationship
between crime and mental illness.
In assessing alternatives to the GBMI statutes, two separate issues must be addressed.
The first deals with the function of the insanity defense within the framework of our
criminal law. Since, as has been demonstrated, the insanity defense is not an anomaly
within the Anglo-American criminal law, but is entirely consistent with the fundamental
principles of that jurisprudence, it needs to be maintained to insure the coherence of the
dants); see also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970) (proof beyond a reasonable doubt held to
be contitutionally required as an essential part of due process of law, even though it was not
enumerated in the Constitution or the Bill of Rights).
274 See supra text accompanying notes 106-07.
2" Forer, supra note 172, at 66.
2'B
	 v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 785 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
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criminal law as a whole. At the same time, however, the disposition of insanity acquittees
must be considered. A preferred alternative to the GBMI statutes would retain the
insanity defense as a means of excusing from criminal responsibility that rare individual
who ought not to be blamed for his conduct, while at the same time safeguarding the
public from persons who may pose a risk of future dangerousness.
Such an alternative may be the approach, taken by a number of states, of the
conditional release of insanity acquittees. In contrast with the GBMI statutes, in which the
emphasis is on a change in the verdict which may be rendered at an insanity defense trial,
the emphasis in conditional release is on the post-verdict stage: on what happens after a
judgment of not guilty by reason of insanity is rendered. The GBMI statutes seek to
protect the public by limiting the number of persons who may be found not guilty by
reason of insanity. The conditional release approach, on the other hand, seeks to assure
the public's protection by providing meaningful psychiatric treatment and effective
supervision of insanity acquittees, through a program of graduated, step-by-step relaxa-
tion of controls which is designed with both the acquittee's mental health and his apparent
dangerousness in mind.
The theory behind conditional release is relatively straightforward. Psychiatrists have
long recognized the difficulty in predicting the future dangerousness of an incarcerated
individual,'" simply because t he environment in which the psychiatrist sees this person is
so different than that of the outside world. What may be a successful adjustment to the
constraints of institutional life may be maladaptive behavior for the real world. As one
court has put it, "[G]ood patients may be bad risks.""8
An insanity acquittee may become adjusted to life inside the hospital . . .. But
[this] adjustment ... gives no assurance that [he] . . . would refrain from
reestablishing [his] . undesirable behavior patterns if released. In fact, the
more completely a person accepts the regulated environment of the hospital,
the more unfitted he may be to deal with the demands of an unregulated free
life."9
477
 Indeed, today there is nearly universal agreement among both psychiatrists and lawyers that
psychiatric predictions of dangerousness are quite inaccurate and unreliable. For example, the
American Psychiatric Association's Task Force on Clinical Aspects of the Violent Offender has
declared: "[]Judgments [of dangerousness] are fundamentally of very low reliability, much as would
be the prediction of 'altruism' or other human behaviors." TASK FORCE REPORT #8, Clinical Aspects
of the Violent Offender 23 (1974) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT].
Similarly:
[There] is a large and growing body of research dramatically demonstrating that when
a group of prisoners or mental patients who have been predicted to be violent are
nonetheless released into the community, the majority, frequently the vast majority, do
not commit the violent behavior expected of them ... The persistence of this finding is itself
remarkable.' no study has ever found prediction to be more accurate than inaccurate.
Monahan, Prediction Research and the Emergency Commitment of Dangerous Mentally Ill Persons: A Recon-
sideration, 135 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 198, 199 (1978) (emphasis added).
Despite the skepticism with which a growing number of psychiatrists, social scientists, and
lawyers view predictions of future dangerousness, some jurists still find such predictions persuasive.
See, e.g., Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983) (Supreme Court upheld Texas' use of psychiatric
prediction of future dangerousness as a factor to be considered in determining whether the death
penalty ought to be imposed), reh'g denied, 464 U.S. 874 (1983).
2" State v. Carter, 64 N.J. 382, 403, 316 A.2d 449, 461 (1974).
279 Weihofen, supra note 173, at 864. Accord, K. BURKHART, WOMEN IN PRISON 132 (1973).
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Conversely, a patient who is aggressive, independent, and questioning of authority may
well be better equipped to handle life in normal society.'"
Recognizing this predictive problem, courts in a number of states have attempted to
reconcile the public's concern about the premature release of insanity acquittees, who are
perceived as being more dangerous than other offenders because of their mental ill-
ness,'" with the acquittees' liberty interest in being free from state custody if they are no
longer mentally ill or dangerous. 2" In a conditional release program, the court and the
treating psychiatrist have an opportunity to observe the acquittee's behavior as he moves
from greater to lesser restrictions on his liberty, and can thereby assess more accurately
the likelihood that the acquit.tee will engage in violent actions if he is released without
restraint into the community. A good conditional release program provides a
built-in graded system wherein a person could be sent from a maximum
security to a moderate security to a civil hospital to a halfway house, have the
options of out-patient treatment under mandate, so that. the psychiatrists ..
who are treating the person and . . . testifying to the judge who maintains
jurisdiction over the case ... would have the option of evaluating the person
in various degrees of security . 283
The therapy-centered approach of conditional release makes good financial sense as
well. In New Jersey, for example, a good conditional release program will provide the
"° Id. Cf. . Flynn, Psychatropic Drugs and Informed Consent, 30 Hosp. & COMM UNITY PSYCHIATRY 51,
53 (1979).
281 The public is more afraid of insanity acquittees than other persons charged with crime
because the former are viewed as both "mad" and "had," and therefore unpredictable in their
violence. But the limited data which is available shows that many insanity acquittees are acquitted of
non-violent crimes and that the overwhelming majority of mentally ill criminals who have been
predicted to be dangerous turn out not to be so.
In New Jersey, for example, "a survey of insanity acquittals during the years 1974-1982 . .
showed that deaths were involved in less than one-third of all cases. Interestingly, the plea was also
raised in cases of non-violent offenses such as writing false checks, carrying an unloaded starter's
pistol, and drug use." Rodriguez letter, supra note 2. See also Pasewark, Insanity Plea: A Review of the
Research Literature, 91 PSYCHIATRY & L. 357, 366 (1981), In Oregon, "only about 5 percent of the .. .
insanity acquittees were acquitted of murder, with assault and less serious crime being the bulk of the
cases." Insanity Hearings, supra note 80, at 470 (testimony of Dr. John Monahan).
As to the consequences of releasing the criminally insane, perhaps the most startling results were
obtained in Operation Baxstrom, the release of New York prisoners mandated by the Supreme
Court's decision in Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966). The decision in Baxstrom led to the
transfer of 967 inmates of hospitals for the criminally insane to regular civil hospitals. Ultimately,
some of these were returned to the community in accordance with existing civil commitment and
release procedures. "These patients were considered to be among the most dangerous in the state
and were expected to display their dangerousness both in the civil hospitals to which they were
transferred and in the community upon their release. The level of dangerous behavior among the
patients we followed in the community was 14 percent [O]ur four-year follow-up of these
patients revealed that only 26 of the 967 had exhibited sufficiently violent behavior at the civil
hospitals to justify their return to hospitals for the criminally insane." Cocozza and Steadman, The
Failure of Psychiatric Predictions of Dangerousness: Clear and Convicting Evidence, 29 RUTGERS L. REV.
1084, 1090 -93 (1976).
282 In O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975), the Supreme Court declared that there is no
constitutional basis for confining even a mentally ill individual involuntarily if he is "dangerous to no
one and can live safely in freedom." Id. at 575. Similarly, there can he no state interest in confining a
non-mentally ill individual based upon a psychiatric prediction of dangerousness. Such involuntary
commitment is the equivalent of preventitive detention.
188 Insanity Hearings, supra note 80, at 462-63 (testimony of Dr. Robert Sadoff).
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insanity acquittee with room and board at a half-way house located in the community,
daily participation in an out-patient treatment program, and a weekly visit. with a psychia-
trist. Such a program costs approximately $20,000 per year, roughly 55% of what. it would
cost to maintain the acquittee in a state mental hospital, and only $3,000 more than the
average cost of maintaining an inmate in a New Jersey prison, with only minimal psychiat-
ric treatment. 2" Similarly, in Oregon, the current maximum cost of maintaining an
insanity acquittee in a conditional release program is $13,282 per year, approximately
one-third the amount required to maintain him in the forensic unit of the state mental
hospita1. 285 This too compares favorably with the cost of providing psychiatric care in an
Oregon prison, where the current average cost of maintaining an inmate in prison is
$13,412 per year, and the additional cost of providing psychiatric treatment. or other
therapeutic counseling is $105 per day, or $39,022 per year.'" Thus it cannot be convinc-
ingly argued, alit. might in the case of an economically depressed state like Michigan, that
the conditional release of insanity acquittees is fiscally impractical.
Two principal approaches to conditional release presently exist.: the administrative
and the judicial models. The sole representative of the administrative model is Oregon's
Psychiatric Security Review Board (hereinafter . PSRB or Board). This Board was estab-
lished by statute in 1977 in response to concerns of the public and state mental health
personnel that insanity acquittees were being prematurely released from state mental
hospitals without adequate judicial, or other, supervision.'" The Board is an independent
state agency with five members — a psychiatrist., a psychologist, a person with substantial
parole and probation expertise and experience, a puhlic member, and an experienced
criminal trial lawyer not presently a prosecutor or public defender.'" The Board meets
periodically to review the disposition of all insanity acquittees committed to its jurisdic-
tion.
Under Oregon law, after a trial, the judge must determine what crime the acquittee
"would have been convicted of had [he] ... been found responsible." 289 I f this crime is a
felony or a violent misdemeanor, and "the court finds, by a preponderance of the
284 Personal Communication from Patrick D. Reilly, Mental Health Consultant, Department of
the Public Advocate, Division of Mental Health Advocacy, State of New Jersey, Trenton. New Jersey
(April, 1985).
288 Personal Communication from Thomas 0. Stern, Data Coordinator for the Program Office
of Mental or Emotional Disturbance, Oregon Mental Health Division, Salem, Oregon (April, 1985).
286 Personal Communication from Marlene Haugland, Executive Assistant to the Director of the
Oregon Department of' Corrections, Salem, Oregon (April, 1985).
2" There were 268 persons acquitted on grounds of insanity in Oregon during the period 1971
to 1976, compared with 225 insanity acquittals in New York State (which had a population nearly
eight times as large as Oregon's) during the same period. Pati, Letter to the Editor, 136 AM. J,
PSYCHIATRY 1346, 1346-47 (1979). Because of this large number of insanity acquittees, judges were
unable to keep track of all the people whom they had committed to the slate hospital, to design
effective conditional release programs for them, or to monitor their performance while conditionally
released. Some judges were felt to be overly deferential to the views of mental health personnel. As a
result or inadequate judicial supervision and hospital overcrowding, "many individuals were released
from the hospital after a very short stay." Rogers, 1981 Oregon Legislation Relating to the Insanity
Defense and the Psychiatric Security Review Board, 18 Wit.i.AmErry. L.J. 23, 24 (1982). As in Michigan,
"several incidents of serious anti-social behavior among the [prematurely) released population ...
pointed to the need for more stringent supet vision." Bloom and Bloom, Disposition of Insanity Defense
Cases in Oregon, 9 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 93, 95 (1981).
aaa OR. REV. STAT. § 161.385 (1), (2) (1983).
asa OR. REV. STAT. § 161.325 (2)(a) (1983).
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evidence that the person is affected by mental disease or defect and presents a substantial
danger to others requiring commitment to a state mental hospital ... or conditional
release, the court shall order the person placed under the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric
Security Review Board for care and treatment ... " 29° for the maximum sentence he could
have received had he been found responsible.
Within ninety days of an insanity acquittee's commitment to the slate mental hospital
and two years of an acquittee's conditional release, the PSRB must review the case and
determine whether the disposition is appropriate or whether the acquittee should be
conditionally or unconditionally released. 291
 The Board's decision is to be based primarily
on the criterion of "the protection of society," not on the insanity acquittee's treatment
needs. 292 Conditional release is mandated, however, if the PSRB "finds that the person
presents a substantial danger to others but that the person can be adequately controlled
with supervision and treatment if conditionally released and that necessary supervision
and treatment are available . . . ." 293
 This approach thus apparently codifies the doctrine
of the "least restrictive alternative which has long been advocated as a necessary aspect of
all civil commitment of the mentally ill." 294
The alternative to the administrative model of conditional release is the judicial one,
presently authorized by statute in more than half the states. 293
 One example of a good
judicial conditional release program is the New Jersey program. As long ago as the early
1970's, the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized the need for a phased, gradual return
of the insanity acquittee to the community, which was carefully monit ered by individual
trial judges to insure that the interests of both the insanity acquittee and the public were
protected. Under the New Jersey scheme, as articulated by its Supreme Court in Slate v.
Carter,'" a program of conditional release of insanity acquittees is required to balance the
public's interest in protection from dangerous offenders and the insanity acquittee's right
to psychiatric treatment. In Carter, the court held that persons acquitted on grounds of
insanity had a right to conditional release from the mental institution to which they had
20' OR. REV. STAT. § 161.327 (1983).
"' OR, REV. STAT. § 161.341 (7) (1983).
"2 Ort. REV. STAT. § 161.336 (10) (1983).
2" OR. REV. STAT. 161.336 (1) (1983).
One Oregon court has found that this provision imposes a heavy burden on the PSRB to find a
suitable conditional release placement for an insanity acquittee, and that mere difficulty in finding
one is riot sufficient to meet this burden. Cochenour v. Psychiatric Sec. Review Rd., 47 Or. App. 1097,
1106-07, 615 P.2d 1155, 1160 (1980).
2" Under this doctrine, a state must show that "a particular legislative course [is] ... the least
drastic method of achieving a desired end .... [T]he state must demonstrate that the infringement
upon human liberties which occurs is unavoidable if the purpose of the state is to he achieved." Singer,
Sending Men to Prison: Constitutional Aspects of the Burden of Proof and the Doctrine of the Least Drastic
Alternative as Applied to Sentencing Determinations, 58 CORNELL. 1,. REV. 51, 55-56 (1972) (emphasis in
original).
The doctrine has been applied in a number of cases concerning the mentally ill which have
declared that the state must provide for its mentally ill a therapeutic environment which is the least
restrictive one necessary to achieve the safety of the mentally ill individual and the public. See, e.g.,
Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657, 660-62 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (court ordered the District of Columbia
authorities to show that no alternative means' existed, other than confinement in a large public
mental hospital, of protecting a senile sixty year old woman who "wandered" in the streets of
Washington, D.C.)
2" See State v. Carter, 64 N.J. 382, 401 n.10, 316 A.2d 449, 460 n.10 (1974).
289 64 N.J. 382, 316 A.2d 449 (1974).
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been committed even if they were not fully "restored to reason" or "cured" of their
underlying mental illness, as long as there was adequate psychiatric supervision and other
provisions for the protection of the public. The court premised its decision on the
fundamental purpose of committing insanity acquittees to a mental hospital — treatment
and rehabilitation, which could only be achieved by a judicially authorized gradual,
supervised return to the community.'" To deny "the possibility of conditional. release,"
said the court, would be "'tantamount to an elaborate mask for preventive detention' of
the mentally ill," 2"
In State v. Krol, 2" the New Jersey Supreme Court built upon Carter, to hold that for
purposes of evaluating insanity acquittees' continued need for psychiatric hospitalization
and treatment, they were to be treated just like other "civilly" mentally ill individuals, with
the same procedural safeguards and substantive commitment criteria used for this latter
group. 3" The court reached this result based upon considerations of both due process 30 '
and equal protection of the laws.'"
This court-centered approach to determining when, and under what conditions, the
release of an insanity acquittee is appropriate, has been endorsed by the American Bar
Association's Standing Committee on Association Standards for Criminal Justice. These
standards suggest that all decisions regarding "authorized leave," defined to encompass
anything "from a brief pass through a projected long-term release on conditions," 3"
should be subject to judicial scrutiny before being implemented, to ensure adequate
consideration of the problems of "public safety and community concern" along with the
therapeutic desirability or necessity of the authorized leave. 3'"
Whether administratively or judicially supervised, then, conditional release of insan-
ity acquittees provides an alternative to the GBMI statutes which protects both the
offender's constitutional rights and the public safely at a reasonable cost. Such an ap-
proach also leaves intact the insanity defense, which is crucial to maintaining the require-
ment of blameworthiness throughout the criminal law as a precondition to conviction.
CONCLUSION
The insanity defense had its genesis in a simple, homogeneous, highly religious and
moralistic society. At the time of its inception it was easy to have a rule exempting from
2c'T The judicial approach also has the advantage of frankly acknowledging that the decision to
release is a political and policy one. Medical opinion is an important factor to be weighed in making
this decision, but it is only part of the equation. In our society, the job of balancing conflicting
individual and social interests has been given to judges, not doctors. See Insanity Hearings, supra note
80, at 472-73 (testimony of Dr. John Monahan).
2" Carter, 64 N.J. at 398, 316 A.2d at 458 (quoting Greenwald, Disposition of the Insane Defendant
After 'Acquittal' —The Long Road From Commitment To Release, 49 J. CRIM. L. C. & P.S. 583, 586 (1959).
2" 68 N.J. 236, 344 A.2d 289 (1975).
In State v. Fields, 77 N.J. 282, 390 A.2d 574 (1978), the New Jersey Supreme Court declared
that the Krol mandate of equality of treatment of the "criminally" and "civilly" mentally ill meant that
both groups were required to have automatic periodic judicial review of their commitments, includ-
ing the terms of their conditional release, to determine if the restrictions on their liberty which had
been previously ordered by the court were still necessary. 77 N.J. at 297-99, 390 A.2d at 581-82.
30 ' Kral, 68 N.J. at 246-49, 344 A.2d at 295-96.
302 Id. at 250-55, 344 A.2d at 297-99.
303 ABA Standing Committee on Association Standards for Criminal Justice, Provisional Crimi-
nal Justice Mental Health Standards V-8 (April, 1982).
304 Id.; see also Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972).
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criminal responsibility those few individuals who lacked a "vicious will," 35 particularly
when the result of a finding of insanity was lengthy, if' not lifetime, incarceration in an
insane asylum rather than death.
In a complex and heterogeneous society, however, the insanity defense is called upon
to answer a number of competing questions: the moral question of who may justly be held
responsible, the psychiatric question of how best to treat the mentally ill offender, and the
social policy question of how best to protect the community from dangerous individuals
while at the same time safeguarding those individuals' constitutional rights. Today, the
exculpation from criminal liability provided by the insanity defense is deeply troubling to
many citizens. They find it inconceivable that a person could on one day suffer from
mental illness so severe as to not know what he was doing or to be able to stop himself
from doing it, and then, a few months later, due to psychiatric treatment and medication,
be pronounced "sane." Their sense of justice is offended, particularly if the defendant.
was charged with a serious offense. The result, in a time of great concern about crime in
general, is tremendous public pressure to minimize or eliminate the use of the insanity
defense, pressure to which Congress has recently acceded in enacting a drastically re-
duced version of the insanity defense for federal criminal offenses.
This article has examined another attempt to reduce the "abuse" of the insanity
defense, the "Guilty But Mentally Ill" statutes, and has concluded that these laws are a
constitutionally impermissible means of dealing with the dangerous mentally ill offender.
The GBMI statutes improperly cloak a punitive attitude toward the mentally ill criminal
in the guise of treatment, confusing the very different. theoretical underpinnings of a
system of punishment and a system of treat mem. These laws deny mentally ill persons
who are found "guilty but mentally ill" instead of not. guilt y by reason of insanity their
"constitutional right to receive such individual 1psychiatricl treatment as will give each of
them a realistic opportunity to be cured or to improve ... his mental condition." 3"" In
practice, the psychiatric treatment. accorded GBMI inmates tends to be either minimal or
nonexistent. Even GBMI prisoners who receive adequate treatment at. a psychiatric
hospital are denied the equal protection of the laws when compared to insanity acquittees,
since GBMI convicts must serve out the remainder of their prison terms upon restoration
to mental health, while insanity acquinees must be released.
The constitutional violation of the denial of i he right to treatment is compounded by
the inherent tendency of the GBM1 statutes to encourage compromise verdicts. Due to
the statutes' inadequate distinction between "mental illness" and "insanity," it is possible,
and indeed likely, for a trier of fact to resolve any doubts it may have about. a defendant's
sanity at the time of the offense in favor of a finding of "mere" mental illness. That
finding assures the trier of fact that the defendant will be kept off the streets for some
time, while it simultaneously holds out the promise of psychiatric treatment for an
obviously disturbed individual. The constitutional right to present an insanity defense,
inherent in the constitutional rights to due process and equal protection of the laws, is
denied in any case in which a defendant is found "guilty but mentally ill" when, without
that option, he would have been found not guilty by reason of insanity.
In contrast, the conditional release approach, while not perfect, holds out the pro-
mise of making the insanity defense viable today. The conditional release approach
continues to accept the fundamental premise of the insanity defense that there are a few
305 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 33, at 19.
306 Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 784 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
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individuals who cannot. morally be held accountable for their actions. In practice it offers
a real chance of meaningful psychiatric therapy and a return to sanity for such mentally ill
offenders. At the same time, it strives to protect. society from the dangerous mentally ill
individual in a manner maximizing- the vindication of the latter's constitutional rights.
Conditional release thus provides the hest answer we have today to the difficult moral,
medical, and political questions raised by the insanity defense. Its adoption and im-
plementation across the nation would, in the long run, provide greater public protection
than the superfically attractive GBMI approach.
We live in an age in which people are expressing greater fears about their safety and
security, and are concerned about a lack of control over their lives. At. such a time, it is
easy to seize upon the perceived abuses of the insanity defense as both symbol and cause
of increased crime and disorder. Yet the insanity defense is no more than "a pimple on
the nose of justice, -3"7 and the "Guilty But. Mentally Ill" statutes are no more than an
ill-conceived and ill-fiaing band-aid.
304 Stone, The Insanity Defense on Trial, 33 H ARV. L. ScH. Bul.i.. 15, 17 (1982).
